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increasingly focus on—and defer to—government’s claim to control 
its workers’ expression to protect its own speech. 
                                                     
Copyright © 2009 by Helen Norton. 
 † Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. Many thanks to Rachel 
Arnow-Richman, Sam Bagenstos, Kathleen Bergin, Danielle Keats Citron, Caroline Mala 
Corbin, Roberto Corrada, Nestor Davidson, David Duff, Melissa Hart, Michael Healy, Danielle 
Holley-Walker, David Hudson, Thom Lambert, Marty Katz, Dayna Bowen Matthew, Scott 
Moss, Bob Nagel, Raja Raghunath, Lawrence Rosenthal, Nantiya Ruan, Paul Secunda, Michael 
Selmi, Phil Weiser, Mimi Wesson, and Greg Young for their insightful comments. This Article 
also benefited greatly from participants’ comments at the 2008 Jurisgenesis conference, jointly 
hosted by the Washington University and St. Louis University Schools of Law, the University of 
North Carolina’s 2008 First Amendment Law Review symposium, Public Citizens, Public 
Servants: Free Speech in the Post-Garcetti Workplace, the 2008 Northeast People of Color and 
the Law Conference, the Third Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor and 
Employment Law, and a University of Colorado School of Law faculty workshop. Finally, 
thanks to the University of Colorado School of Law for its financial support for this project, to 
the Duke Law Journal for excellent editorial support, and to Katharine Decker for outstanding 
research assistance. 
NORTON IN FINAL FINAL 9/3/2009  9:05:16 PM 
2 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1 
  More specifically, courts increasingly permit government to 
control its employees’ expression at work, characterizing this speech 
as the government’s own for which it has paid with a salary. This 
trend frustrates a meaningful commitment to republican government 
by allowing government officials to punish, and thus deter, 
whistleblowing and other valuable on-the-job speech that would 
otherwise facilitate the public’s ability to hold the government 
politically accountable for its choices. Courts also increasingly 
consider government workers to be speaking as employees even when 
away from work, deferring to the government’s assertion that its 
association with employees who engage in certain off-duty expression 
undermines its credibility in communicating its own contrary views. 
Implicit in courts’ reasoning is the premise that a public entity’s 
employment relationship with an individual who engages in certain 
expression communicates a substantive message to the public that the 
government is entitled to control. Courts’ unfettered deference to such 
claims would permit government agencies to fire workers for any 
unpopular or controversial off-duty speech to which the public might 
object, potentially enforcing orthodox expression as a condition of 
public employment. 
  To be sure, government speech is as valuable as it is inevitable. But 
taken together, these trends lead to the rejection of government 
workers’ First Amendment claims in a growing number of cases that 
undermine workers’ free speech rights as well as the public’s interest 
in transparent government. Because of this shift’s normatively 
troubling implications, this Article proposes a new constitutional 
framework for public employee speech cases that attends more 
carefully to what it is that government seeks to communicate and 
whether that message is actually impaired by employee speech. It thus 
proposes a less deferential approach to assessing government’s 
expressive claims to its workers’ speech both on and off the job, 
exploring both categorical and contextual frameworks for identifying 
more precisely the comparatively small universe of workers’ speech 
that actually threatens government’s own expression. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Courts assessing public employees’ First Amendment claims 
increasingly engage in a key, but unexamined, doctrinal shift: 
although past courts focused on whether and when public employers’ 
interest in managerial control and operational efficiency outweighed 
workers’ speech interests, courts now concentrate on—and defer to—
government’s claim to control the speech of its workers to protect its 
own expression. A careful examination of this trend in light of the 
values underlying the government speech doctrine, however, reveals 
that courts too often permit government to assert control over 
employee speech that does not actually undermine its own 
expression. Courts’ increased deference in this area thus effectively 
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works as a bludgeon against public employee speech when a scalpel 
offers a more appropriate tool for protecting government’s legitimate 
expressive interests as well as workers’ own free speech rights and the 
public’s interest in transparent government. To this end, this Article 
proposes a less deferential approach to assessing government’s 
expressive claims to its workers’ speech both on and off the job, 
exploring categorical as well as contextual frameworks for identifying 
more precisely the comparatively small universe of worker speech 
that actually threatens government’s own expression. 
More specifically, as one component of courts’ growing 
deference to government’s expressive claims, courts increasingly 
permit government to control its workers’ on-the-job expression by 
characterizing such speech as the government’s own for which it has 
paid with a salary. As the Supreme Court held in Garcetti v. Ceballos,1 
public employees’ speech made “pursuant to their official duties” 
receives no First Amendment protection from employer discipline2 
because the government should be permitted to 
“exercise . . . employer control over what the employer itself has 
commissioned or created.”3 Lower courts routinely apply this new 
bright-line rule to dispose of the First Amendment claims of a wide 
range of public employees punished for their on-the-job reports of 
safety hazards, ethical improprieties, and other government 
misconduct.4 Examples include the rejection of First Amendment 
challenges by prosecutors disciplined for criticizing police work,5 
government workers fired after reporting public officials’ financial or 
ethical improprieties,6 and department heads terminated for 
criticizing administration priorities.7 Courts’ unblinking deference to 
such assertions thus frustrates a meaningful commitment to 
republican government because it allows government officials to 
punish, and thus deter, whistleblowing and other on-the-job speech 
that would otherwise inform voters’ views and facilitate their ability 
to hold the government politically accountable for its choices. 
A few examples illustrate this trend. The Seventh Circuit, for 
instance, applied Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does 
                                                     
 1. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 2. Id. at 421. 
 3. Id. at 422. 
 4. See cases cited infra note 16. 
 5. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410. 
 6. See cases cited infra note 16. 
 7. See Chambers v. Dep’t of the Interior, 515 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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not protect a police officer’s reports that his supervisor was engaged 
in unlawful activity because the officer’s statement was made 
pursuant to his duty to report possible wrongdoing.8 As concurring 
Judge Rovner explained: “Detective Kolatski was performing his job 
admirably at the time of these events, and although his demotion for 
truthfully reporting allegations of misconduct may be morally 
repugnant, after Garcetti it does not offend the First Amendment.”9 
A wide range of public employees have met similar fates after 
reporting health and safety violations and financial irregularities to 
the displeasure of their supervisors. The Third Circuit, for example, 
applied Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not 
protect internal reports of health and safety hazards—including 
elevated heavy metals levels—by state troopers and firearms 
instructors at the state’s shooting range because the reports were 
made pursuant to their official duty to report operational problems 
and to maintain a safe worksite.10 The Second Circuit similarly 
concluded that the First Amendment does not protect a special 
education counselor who complained about the lack of proper classes 
for special education students because her official duties required her 
to monitor her students’ needs and progress.11 Along the same lines, 
the Seventh Circuit applied Garcetti to hold that a prison guard’s 
internal reports of a possible breach of prison security were 
unprotected because they took place pursuant to her official 
responsibilities to keep the prison secure.12 And the Eleventh Circuit 
held that the First Amendment did not protect a university employee 
fired after reporting improprieties in the university’s federal financial 
aid awards because her duties as a financial aid manager required her 
to flag such problems.13 
In a related trend involving the First Amendment claims of 
public employees disciplined for off-duty speech, government 
increasingly considers its workers to be speaking as employees even 
when away from work, asserting that its association with employees 
who engage in certain off-duty expression undermines its credibility 
in communicating its own contrary views. Examples include 
                                                     
 8. Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 597 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 9. Id. at 599 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 10. Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 11. Woodlock v. Orange Ulster B.O.C.E.S., 281 Fed. App’x 66, 68 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary 
order). 
 12. Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961, 965–66 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 13. Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761–62 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 
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firefighters fired for participating in a holiday parade that featured 
mocking racist stereotypes,14 a university vice president disciplined for 
writing a newspaper column questioning gay rights,15 and police 
officers discharged for appearing in or maintaining sexually explicit 
websites.16 In response, courts often characterize such off-duty speech 
as harmful not because of what it reflects about the worker’s own 
ability to perform her job, but rather because of what it 
communicates about the government agency as a whole. These 
decisions reflect courts’ intuition that the public will inevitably 
associate public employees’ off-duty expression with their 
governmental employers—just as voters often ascribe the views of a 
political candidate’s associates to the candidate himself.17 
Courts’ unconstrained deference to such contentions, however, 
would permit government agencies to fire workers for any off-duty 
speech to which the public might object without any meaningful 
tether to the effectiveness of government operations. Indeed, absent 
any limiting principles, certain individuals may be unemployable for 
many government jobs purely because of their unpopular or 
controversial off-duty expression—for example, marching in a gay 
pride parade or blogging for or against either abortion or immigration 
reform. This trend threatens to gain momentum with employers’ 
increasing ability to learn of workers’ off-duty speech through 
YouTube, Facebook, and other social networking and 
communications technologies.18 The effects of this trend may also 
widen because of the Court’s willingness to extend its First 
Amendment doctrine governing public employees’ speech to the 
                                                     
 14. See Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 15. See Scott Jaschik, When Equity Official Takes Anti-Gay Stance, INSIDE HIGHER ED, 
May 5, 2008, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/05/05/toledo. 
 16. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004) (per curiam); Dible v. City of 
Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 2008); Thaeter v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 449 
F.3d 1342, 1344 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 17. See Shankar Vedantam, The Candidate, the Preacher, and the Unconscious Mind, 
WASH. POST, May 5, 2008, at A2 (describing observers’ tendency to ascribe the views of Barack 
Obama’s pastor to the candidate himself). 
 18. See United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 446 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (discussing First 
Amendment implications of the military disciplining a servicemember for his Facebook page 
advocating white supremacy); TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL S. ARNOW-RICHMAN & CHARLES 
A. SULLIVAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 326 (2007) 
(“Indeed, workers, and job applicants in particular, would be well-advised to assume that 
anything they say or post in publicly accessible areas of the internet will become known to 
potential employers . . . .”). 
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expression of private speakers who engage in contractual and other 
relationships with governmental bodies.19 
Taken together, government’s expansive claims to control public 
employees’ expression mark a disturbing trend that imperils not only 
the free speech rights of more than twenty million government 
workers,20 but also the public’s interest in transparent government. 
This requires a new First Amendment framework that more carefully 
attends to what it is that government seeks to communicate—and 
whether that message is actually impaired by employee speech. 
To this end, Part I describes courts’ growing deference to 
government’s expressive claims when assessing public employees’ 
First Amendment challenges. Part II then focuses specifically on 
public employees’ on-duty speech, exploring the theoretical and 
practical foundations of the government speech doctrine. After 
demonstrating the mismatch between current doctrine and 
government’s actual expressive interests, it proposes to replace the 
Garcetti rule with a considerably less deferential approach that 
attends to the public’s interest in transparent government. Part III 
then turns to public employees’ off-duty speech, examining the 
theoretical and practical assumptions underlying government’s 
concern that its association with an employee who engages in 
objectionable speech away from work may undermine its own 
communicative abilities. After describing courts’ tendency to defer to 
this concern without articulating any meaningful limitations thereto, 
this Part proposes two possible replacements for the deferential status 
quo: a categorical and a contextual framework, both of which identify 
more precisely the comparatively small universe of off-duty speech 
that actually threatens government’s legitimate expression. These 
approaches include attention to whether certain jobs trigger such 
strong associations with the government that public employees in 
those jobs can never escape their governmental role to speak purely 
                                                     
 19. See Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S. 291, 299–300 
(2007) (relying on public employee precedents for guidance in assessing First Amendment 
claims of a private school that had voluntarily joined a governmental athletic association); Bd. 
of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (relying on public employee 
precedents for guidance in assessing First Amendment claims of an independent contractor); 
Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596–97 (6th Cir. 2007) (relying on public employee 
precedents for guidance in assessing First Amendment claims of student-athletes). 
 20. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT, HOURS 
AND EARNINGS FROM THE CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS SURVEY (2008), available at 
http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/outside.jsp?survey=ce (reporting that federal, state, and local 
governments currently employ 22,703,000 workers). 
NORTON IN FINAL FINAL 9/3/2009  9:05:16 PM 
8 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1 
as private citizens even when away from work, and whether the 
context of the off-duty speech otherwise leads the public reasonably 
to associate the expression with the government. The Article 
concludes by applying those principles to a series of fact patterns, and 
by addressing likely objections. 
I.  THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE: COURTS’ EXPANSIVE DEFERENCE 
TO GOVERNMENT’S EXPRESSIVE CLAIMS WHEN ASSESSING PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES’ FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the First 
Amendment limits government’s ability to punish public employee 
speech—although, as described in more detail below, the Court has 
granted government more power to regulate the speech of its workers 
than that of its citizens generally.21 This Part describes courts’ 
framework for assessing public employees’ First Amendment claims, 
highlighting courts’ expanding deference to government’s assertions 
that its own expression may be impaired by its employees’ speech 
both on-duty and off. 
A. Pre-Garcetti: The Pickering/Connick Balancing Test 
The longstanding test for assessing claims that the government 
has unconstitutionally punished public employees for their speech 
requires courts to weigh the individual employee’s interest, as a 
citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern against the 
government’s interest, as an employer, in efficiently providing public 
services.22 Under this framework, courts first assess whether the 
                                                     
 21. See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. Private employers remain constitutionally 
free to control their workers’ speech because the First Amendment does not constrain private 
actors. A patchwork of federal and state statutes provides some protection to private workers’ 
whistleblowing or other speech on certain topics. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) 
(protecting workers’ speech opposing unlawful discrimination). 
 22. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 
(1968). The Court has held that a more rigorous standard should apply to sweeping statutory 
restrictions on public employees’ speech than that applied by Pickering as a post hoc assessment 
of individual disciplinary actions. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 
454, 468 (1995) (“[T]he Government’s burden is greater with respect to this statutory restriction 
on expression than with respect to an isolated disciplinary action. The Government must show 
that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of present and future employees 
in a broad range of present and future expression are outweighed by that expression’s 
‘necessary impact on the actual operation’ of the Government.” (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 
571)). In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995), the Court 
applied this test to strike down a statutory ban on government employees’ receipt of honoraria 
for off-the-job expression, concluding that the government’s operational interests were very 
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contested expression’s subject matter touches upon a matter of public 
concern as a matter of law.23 The Court has defined speech on a 
matter of public concern as speech that addresses “a subject of 
legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of 
value and concern to the public at the time of publication.”24 Note 
that, for these purposes, the subject matter of the speech determines 
its public or private nature, rather than its setting.25 
If the speech in question does not touch upon a subject of public 
concern—for example, a public employee’s personal grievance about 
her own working conditions that is primarily of value to the speaker 
as opposed to the listening public26—then courts routinely uphold the 
government’s decision to discipline such private-concern speech 
without any additional analysis.27 If, however, the plaintiff’s speech 
                                                                                                                          
weak in large part because “the vast majority of the speech at issue in this case does not involve 
the subject matter of Government employment and takes place outside the workplace.” Id. at 
470. 
 23. Connick, 461 U.S. at 143; Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 
(1979). Controversy remains over whether the “public concern” test is an appropriate threshold 
inquiry in First Amendment disputes involving employees’ off-duty—rather than on-the-job—
speech unrelated to employment. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Public Employee Speech in 
Remedial Perspective, 24 J.L. & POL. 129, 145, 150–51 (2008) (questioning the relevance of the 
public concern inquiry). 
 24. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam) (characterizing the 
plaintiff’s sexually explicit website as failing to address a matter of public interest). Courts 
sometimes struggle to distinguish speech on matters of public and private concern. See Stephen 
Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public 
Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43 (1988) (describing courts’ difficulty in parsing speech on matters of 
public and private concern). Compare Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (characterizing any speech referring to race relations—including 
hateful racial speech—as inherently of public concern), with Vinci v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 
253 Neb. 423, 433–34 (1997) (concluding that a public employee’s use of a racial epithet was not 
a matter of public concern for First Amendment purposes). 
 25. See Givhan, 439 U.S. at 413 (holding that a teacher’s private criticism to her principal 
about the school’s desegregation efforts touched upon a matter of public concern even if not 
aired publicly). 
 26. Connick, 461 U.S. at 141; see also Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. at 466 
(“[P]rivate speech that involves nothing more than a complaint about a change in the 
employee’s own duties may give rise to discipline without imposing any special burden of 
justification on the government employer.”). 
 27. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e have refrained 
from intervening in government employer decisions that are based on speech that is of entirely 
private concern. Doubtless some such speech is sometimes nondisruptive; doubtless it is 
sometimes of value to the speakers and the listeners. But we have declined to question 
government employers’ decisions on such matters.”); Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (“When 
employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or 
other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing 
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concerns a matter of public interest, then the dispute proceeds to a 
balancing inquiry. There the court weighs the value of the employee’s 
speech against any detrimental impact on the government’s efficient 
workplace operations, such as any adverse effect on the employee’s 
own performance or the employer’s ability to maintain discipline and 
harmony among co-workers.28 
The Supreme Court first applied this balancing framework in 
Pickering v. Board of Education,29 when it considered the First 
Amendment challenge of a public school teacher fired after writing a 
letter to the local newspaper criticizing the school board’s handling of 
various revenue-raising proposals.30 Upholding the plaintiff’s claim, 
the Court concluded that his speech did not impair the government’s 
interests in operational efficiency because it criticized board members 
with whom he was not in regular contact and thus did not threaten 
the school’s interest in harmonious working relationships.31 
Connick v. Myers32 offers another illustration of this test in 
practice, in which the Court considered the First Amendment 
challenge of a prosecutor disciplined after circulating a questionnaire 
about office policies to her co-workers.33 The Court characterized 
most of the questionnaire as a matter of private, rather than public, 
concern—that is, simply an extension of the plaintiff’s personal 
dispute with her supervisor over her transfer—because it “pertain[ed] 
to the confidence and trust that [the plaintiff’s] coworkers possess in 
various supervisors, the level of office morale, and the need for a 
grievance committee.”34 After concluding that a single questionnaire 
item regarding improper coercion to engage in political activity did 
implicate a subject of public interest and thus triggered the balancing 
analysis, the Court held that the employer’s concerns about the 
questionnaire’s overall impact on harmonious working relationships 
                                                                                                                          
their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First 
Amendment.”). 
 28. See U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564–65 
(1973) (concluding that the Hatch Act’s statutory ban on federal workers’ partisan political 
activities is justified by the government’s operational interest in a federal workforce free from 
political favoritism or the appearance of such favoritism); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 
563, 569–71 (1968). 
 29. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 30. Id. at 564. 
 31. Id. at 569. 
 32. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 33. Id. at 142. 
 34. Id. at 148. 
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outweighed the First Amendment value of that particular query.35 In 
so holding, the Court in Connick made clear its deference to 
government employers’ managerial judgments: 
When close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public 
responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s 
judgment is appropriate. Furthermore, we do not see the necessity 
for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the 
disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships 
is manifest before taking action.36 
By permitting government employers to discipline workers based 
on the content or viewpoint of their speech—for example, speech 
critical of the government—the Pickering/Connick analysis thus 
allows government to restrict its employees’ speech in ways that 
would be “plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.”37 
In other words, the Court permits government considerably greater 
power to control the speech of its workers than the speech of the 
general public because the government’s efficiency interest “is 
elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as 
sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer.”38 
B. On-Duty Speech: Garcetti’s New Bright-Line Rule 
The Supreme Court considerably expanded government 
employers’ already-substantial power over public employee speech in 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, in which it established a new threshold inquiry 
that strips a wide swath of government workers’ expression of any 
First Amendment protection. Garcetti involved a First Amendment 
challenge by a prosecutor disciplined for his internal memorandum 
criticizing a police department affidavit as including serious 
misrepresentations.39 A divided Court held that public employees’ 
speech made “pursuant to their official duties” receives no First 
                                                     
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 151–52; see also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion) 
(“[W]e have given substantial weight to government employers’ reasonable predictions of 
disruption, even when the speech involved is on a matter of public concern, and even though 
when the government is acting as sovereign our review of legislative predictions of harm is 
considerably less deferential.”). 
 37. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995). 
 38. Waters, 511 U.S. at 675; see also Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(observing that, for First Amendment purposes, the government receives greater deference 
when acting as a market participant than when acting as a government regulator). 
 39. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
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Amendment protection from employer discipline.40 Its reasoning 
rested largely on its concern that “[t]o hold otherwise would be to 
demand permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of 
governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with sound 
principles of federalism and the separation of powers.”41 In holding 
that a government employer should remain free to 
“exercise . . . employer control over what the employer itself has 
commissioned or created,”42 the majority created a bright-line rule 
that treats public employees’ speech delivered pursuant to their 
official duties as the government’s own speech—that is, speech that 
the government has bought with a salary and thus may control free 
from First Amendment scrutiny. 
Garcetti treated a public employee’s constitutionally protected 
speech “as a citizen” as entirely separable from that employee’s now-
unprotected speech “pursuant to official duties.”43 In other words, 
according to the Court, those two categories of speech are mutually 
exclusive such that an employee’s official-duties speech can never be 
characterized, for First Amendment purposes, as also expressing the 
employee’s views as a citizen. The Garcetti majority made room for 
just one exception, which leaves open the possibility of a different 
standard for public educators’ speech that raises academic freedom 
issues.44 
                                                     
 40. Id. Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg dissented, offering three different 
views. Justice Stevens would require all claims involving employees’ speech on a matter of 
public interest to proceed to balancing. See id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter, 
joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, predicts that “only comment on official dishonesty, 
deliberately unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety” 
should trump the government’s interests when such speech is delivered pursuant to an 
employee’s official duties. Id. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting). Dissenting Justice Breyer, in 
contrast, would defer to government employers’ judgment in the great majority of cases, 
permitting only employees’ duty-related speech that presents “professional and special 
constitutional obligations” to proceed to balancing. Id. at 447–49 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 41. Id. at 423 (majority opinion). 
 42. Id. at 422. 
 43. See id. at 421 (“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes . . . .”). 
 44. Id. at 425 (“There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or 
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted 
for by this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason 
do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case 
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”). Speech on university governance issues, 
however, may be unprotected after Garcetti even if speech related to scholarship and teaching 
receives some sort of academic freedom protection. See Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 774 
(7th Cir. 2008) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a 
tenured professor’s complaints about a university’s use of grant funds because they were made 
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Since Garcetti, courts begin analyzing public employees’ First 
Amendment claims by determining simply whether the contested 
speech was delivered pursuant to the plaintiff’s official duties. If so, 
the First Amendment challenge fails, regardless of the strength of the 
public’s interest in the expression or its impact, if any, on the 
efficiency of the government workplace. First Amendment claims 
that survive the Garcetti screen—that is, constitutional challenges 
involving government workers’ speech that was not delivered 
pursuant to official duties—continue on to the longstanding 
Pickering/Connick inquiry. Examples include not only workers’ 
speech on matters unrelated to their jobs, but also workers’ reports of 
government wrongdoing to outside entities like the press45 or law 
enforcement agencies46 if such external reporting is not part of their 
official duties (even if it occurred while they were on duty). 
Although public entities frequently hire workers specifically to 
monitor and flag dangerous or illegal conditions, Garcetti now 
                                                                                                                          
pursuant to his official duties); Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1167–68 (C.D. Cal. 2007) 
(applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a professor’s critical 
statements regarding the hiring and promotion of other professors and the use of lecturers 
because this speech was uttered pursuant to his official duty to participate in university 
governance). Moreover, whether academic freedom protections extend beyond postsecondary 
education to primary and secondary school teachers remains unclear. Compare Mayer v. 
Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying Garcetti to 
conclude that an elementary school teacher’s classroom speech occurred pursuant to her official 
duties and was thus unprotected), with Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694–95 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (declining to apply Garcetti to a high school teacher’s classroom speech because of 
academic freedom concerns). 
 45. See Hughes v. Region VII Area Agency on Aging, 542 F.3d 169, 184–87 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(proceeding to Pickering balancing after concluding that a public employee’s official duties did 
not include responding to a reporter’s questions about a supervisor’s alleged sexual 
harassment). 
 46. See, e.g., Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323, 1331–33 (10th Cir. 
2007) (finding the plaintiff superintendent’s communications to the school board about possible 
violations of state and federal law to be unprotected because they were made pursuant to her 
official duties, but permitting the superintendent’s claim involving her speech to the state 
attorney general on the same topic to proceed to Pickering balancing because this speech was 
not among her official duties); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 545–46 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding a 
corrections officer’s reports of misconduct to her superiors unprotected under Garcetti because 
the internal reports were made pursuant to her official duties, but her communications with a 
state senator and the state office of inspector general on the same topic could proceed to 
balancing because they were not made pursuant to her official duties). 
  Indeed, although the Garcetti Court found Mr. Ceballos’s internal criticism of the 
police unprotected by the First Amendment, it remanded his claim that his discipline was also 
motivated by his speech to a local bar association that was not among his official duties. 
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 443–44 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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counterintuitively—indeed, perversely47—empowers the government 
to punish them for doing just that. Garcetti thus undermines the 
government’s accountability to the public even while it purports to 
protect the government’s own expressive interests—expression 
initially recognized to have value only to the extent that it enhances 
government accountability. Indeed, lower courts now routinely apply 
Garcetti to dispose of the constitutional claims of public employees 
fired after their job-required reports regarding hazards or 
improprieties. These claims include police officers terminated after 
reporting public officials’ illegal or improper behavior,48 a wide 
variety of public employees discharged after detailing health and 
safety violations,49 health care workers disciplined after conveying 
                                                     
 47. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t seems perverse to fashion a 
new rule that provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before 
talking frankly to their superiors.”). 
 48. E.g., Callahan v. Fermon, 526 F.3d 1040, 1045 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying Garcetti to 
conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a police officer’s report to supervisors of a 
fellow officer’s potential misconduct because the report was made pursuant to his official duty 
to report wrongdoing); Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying 
Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a police officer’s report to his 
supervisors about a fellow officer’s misconduct in hampering the execution of arrest warrants 
because the report was made pursuant to his official duties); Sillers v. City of Everman, No. 
4:08-CV-055-A, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39187, at *7 (N.D. Tex. May 13, 2008) (applying Garcetti 
to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a police officer’s report to supervising 
officers about unlawful acts committed by other police officers against citizens); Hoover v. 
County of Broome, No. 3:07-cv-0009, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31485, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 
2008) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a correction 
officer’s report about other officers’ excessive use of force on a prison inmate); Baranowski v. 
Waters, No. 05-1379, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21301, at *71 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2008) (applying 
Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a police officer’s complaints to 
his superiors about other police officers’ potential misconduct in a shooting); Maule v. 
Susquehanna Reg’l Police Comm’n, No. 04-CV-05933, 2007 Dist. LEXIS 73065, at *39–41 (E.D. 
Pa. Sept. 27, 2007) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a 
police chief’s report of a local councilman’s improprieties to the state police for criminal 
investigation); Wesolowski v. Bockelman, 506 F. Supp. 2d 118, 121–22 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a sheriff’s 
department employee’s report that a corrections officer beat an inmate); Burns v. Borough of 
Glassboro, No. 05-3034, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42069, at *22–24 (D.N.J. June 11, 2007) 
(applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a police officer’s 
report to internal affairs that the chief sexually harassed another officer); Bland v. Winant, No. 
03-6091, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31094, at *12 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2007) (applying Garcetti to 
conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a police representative’s report to the 
prosecutor of a councilmember’s arrest). 
 49. E.g., Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that the 
plaintiff, a police safety officer, concedes that, after Garcetti, the First Amendment does not 
protect his speech identifying a large number of cancers, miscarriages, birth defects, and other 
health problems suffered by individuals working a precinct with underground gasoline tanks 
when the reports are made pursuant to the plaintiff’s official duties); Green v. Bd. of County 
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concerns about patient care,50 primary and secondary school 
educators punished after describing concerns about student 
treatment,51 and financial managers fired after reporting fiscal 
improprieties.52 
                                                                                                                          
Comm’rs, 472 F.3d 794, 799–801 (10th Cir. 2007) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First 
Amendment does not protect a lab technician’s speech seeking to correct deficiencies in a 
testing program because the speech was made pursuant to her official duties); McGee v. Pub. 
Water Supply, 471 F.3d 918, 920–21 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the 
plaintiff’s expressions of concern about environmental compliance were not protected by the 
First Amendment because they were made pursuant to his official duties as a county water 
supply district manager); McQuary v. Tarrant County, No. 4:06-CV-622-Y, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26494, at *31 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2008) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First 
Amendment does not protect a medical liaison’s letters to the county sheriff’s department 
contending that various policies and procedures were in violation of the law because the speech 
was made pursuant to official duties). 
 50. E.g., Davis v. Cook County, 534 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying Garcetti to 
conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a nurse’s memo “reflect[ing] the concern 
of a conscientious nurse to ensure and contribute to the smooth functioning of the ER and to 
advocate for the well-being of the patients under her care” because these concerns were 
expressed pursuant to her official duties); Barclay v. Michalsky, 493 F. Supp. 2d 269, 271 
(D. Conn. 2007) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a 
nurse’s report that workers in a correctional facility’s psychiatric ward were imposing excessive 
restraints on patients when the reports were made pursuant to her official duties); Coward v. 
Gilroy, No. 3:05-CV-285, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30075, at *11–14 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2007) 
(applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a family care home 
operator’s speech expressing concern about the quality of patients’ health care); Logan v. Ind. 
Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:04-cv-0797-SEB-JPG, 2006 WL 1750583, at *2–3 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2006) 
(applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a correctional facility 
health care administrator’s reports about inmates’ critically inadequate nursing care because 
such reports were made pursuant to her job duties). 
 51. E.g., Pagani v. Meriden Bd. of Educ., No. 3:05-CV-01115, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92267, 
at *10–12 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2006) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment 
does not protect a teacher’s report that another teacher had shared nude photos with students 
when such reports were made pursuant to her official duties); Houlihan v. Sussex Technical Sch. 
Dist., 461 F. Supp. 2d 252, 260 (D. Del. 2006) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First 
Amendment does not protect a school psychologist’s reports of Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act noncompliance because the reports were made pursuant to the plaintiff’s official 
duties). 
 52. E.g., Thompson v. District of Columbia, 530 F.3d 914, 917–18 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(applying Garcetti to conclude that reports of corruption made by the D.C. Lottery’s chief of 
security were made pursuant to his official duties and were thus unprotected); Vila v. Padrón, 
484 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying Garcetti to conclude that a university vice 
president’s objections to a wide range of internal misconduct—such as the university’s failure to 
comply with proper bidding procedures when awarding contracts and its use of university funds 
to illustrate the poetry book of a trustee’s daughter—were unprotected); Williams v. Dallas 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 694 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First 
Amendment does not protect an athletic director’s reports of financial irregularities to the 
principal and athletic department office manager because the reports were prepared in the 
course of performing his job duties); Richards v. City of Lowell, 472 F. Supp. 2d 51, 80 (D. Mass. 
2007) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a city financial 
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Garcetti’s holding that public employees’ speech delivered 
pursuant to their official duties receives no constitutional protection 
thus means the end of most First Amendment claims brought by 
government workers disciplined for their on-duty speech.53 If the 
plaintiff’s speech survives Garcetti’s initial screen, however, the 
dispute then proceeds to the traditional Connick/Pickering inquiry, 
when—as the next Subpart describes—courts increasingly conclude 
that government’s own expressive interest in controlling its public 
image eclipses workers’ expressive interests even when their speech 
occurs away from work. 
C. Beyond Garcetti: Application of the Pickering/Connick Test to 
Off-Duty Speech 
Whereas Garcetti treats public employees’ speech pursuant to 
their official job duties as the government’s own and thus entitled to 
no First Amendment protection, courts increasingly hold that 
government may also control even its workers’ off-duty speech to 
protect its own expressive interests. Courts permit government to 
punish employees for such speech to prevent the delivery of a 
message it fears would otherwise be sent by its association with the 
plaintiff through continued employment. In these cases, the 
government does not urge Garcetti’s application, acknowledging that 
the contested speech did not occur pursuant to the plaintiff’s official 
duties. Instead, as part of the traditional Pickering/Connick balancing 
inquiry, these decisions appear to reflect courts’ intuition that the 
public will inevitably associate government employees’ off-duty 
expression with the agency that employs them in a way that may 
undermine government’s ability to communicate its own views 
effectively.54 Although this intuition is particularly powerful with 
                                                                                                                          
manager’s report of financial improprieties because such reports were made pursuant to his 
official duties); Levy v. Office of the Legislative Auditor, 459 F. Supp. 2d 494, 497–99 (M.D. La. 
2006) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect a state 
auditor’s Toastmaster speech criticizing office policy as speech pursuant to the plaintiff’s official 
duties because his government employer required participation in the Toastmaster program to 
improve public speaking skills). 
 53. See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr., Garcetti’s Palpable Effect on Public Employee Speech, 
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, May 29, 2007, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis. 
aspx?id=18606 (“Garcetti is the kiss of death for many First Amendment cases.”). 
 54. Here I focus only on courts’ conclusions that government workers’ off-duty speech 
carries a public meaning that may compromise the effectiveness of the government agency as an 
institution, rather than on the distinguishable defense that a particular plaintiff’s off-duty speech 
undercuts her own ability to perform her job effectively. For examples of the latter, see infra 
note 195 and accompanying text. 
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respect to workers’ off-duty speech that expressly exposes their 
governmental role, lower courts have increasingly extended this 
rationale to permit the firing of government workers for off-duty 
speech that makes no reference to their governmental employer. 
Consider first the Supreme Court’s decision in City of San Diego 
v. Roe.55 That case involved a police officer fired for maintaining a 
sexually explicit website that included a video of himself stripping off 
a police uniform and masturbating, advertisements for the sale of 
police uniforms and other police equipment, and an e-mail address 
and user profile identifying him as employed in law enforcement.56 A 
unanimous Court rejected his First Amendment challenge, 
characterizing his expression as unprotected because it did not 
involve a matter of public concern.57 Interestingly, even though courts 
generally rubberstamp the government’s actions once they have 
characterized the contested speech as unrelated to a matter of public 
concern,58 the Court here nonetheless went on to consider the 
strength of the government employer’s expressive interests. 
Characterizing the plaintiff’s off-duty speech as job-related because of 
his purposeful reference to his employment, the Court identified the 
speech as harmful not because of what it reflected about the officer’s 
own ability to perform police work, but rather because of what it 
communicated about the police department as a whole: 
Far from confining his activities to speech unrelated to his 
employment, Roe took deliberate steps to link his videos and other 
wares to his police work, all in a way injurious to his employer. The 
use of the uniform, the law enforcement reference in the Web site, 
the listing of the speaker as “in the field of law enforcement,” and 
the debased parody of an officer performing indecent acts while in 
the course of official duties brought the mission of the employer and 
the professionalism of its officers into serious disrepute.59 
Implicit in the Court’s reasoning is the premise that a public entity’s 
employment relationship with an individual who engages in certain 
                                                     
 55. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam). San Diego may carry 
implications for public employees’ substantive due process, as well as their free speech, rights. 
See Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The Constitutionalization 
of Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 85, 127–35 (2006). 
 56. San Diego, 543 U.S. at 78. 
 57. Id. at 81–84. 
 58. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 59. San Diego, 543 U.S. at 84. 
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expression—here, sexually explicit speech that implicated his law 
enforcement employment60—communicates a substantive message to 
the public that the government is entitled to control. Indeed, because 
the plaintiff’s off-duty speech in San Diego intentionally implicated 
his employment, it presented an especially strong threat to the 
government’s own expressive interests. 
With little analysis, however, lower courts have significantly 
extended this holding to permit the firing of government workers for 
a variety of off-duty speech that makes no reference to the 
government for fear that the public will nonetheless ascribe this 
speech to the plaintiff’s government employer.61 The Ninth Circuit, 
for example, stretched San Diego’s reasoning when it rejected a First 
Amendment challenge by a police officer who had been fired for 
maintaining a sexually explicit website featuring his wife.62 Although 
the website made no reference to law enforcement generally or to the 
plaintiff’s employment specifically, the court concluded that the 
public would inevitably associate the plaintiff’s off-duty expression 
with the police department that employs him: 
[I]t can be seriously asked whether a police officer can ever 
disassociate himself from his powerful public position sufficiently to 
make his speech (and other activities) entirely unrelated to that 
position in the eyes of the public and his superiors. Whether overt or 
temporarily hidden, Ronald Dible’s activity had the same practical 
effect—it “brought the mission of the employer and the 
professionalism of its officers into serious disrepute.” . . . The law 
and their own safety demands that [police officers] be given a degree 
of respect, and the sleazy activities of Ronald and Megan Dible 
could not help but undermine that respect.63 
Courts have credited similar governmental concerns when 
rejecting the First Amendment claims of police officers fired for racist 
                                                     
 60. Id. at 79. 
 61. Co-workers, as well as the government agency itself, may share similar associational 
concerns. For example, a police officer may feel that other officers’ offensive off-duty speech 
debases her own public image, devaluing her employment. 
 62. Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 928–29 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Thaeter v. Palm 
Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1355–56 (11th Cir. 2006) (applying San Diego to 
uphold the termination of police officers for their off-duty appearance on sexually explicit 
websites). 
 63. Dible, 515 F.3d at 926, 928 (quoting San Diego, 543 U.S. at 81). Dible further notes that 
concerns about a heckler’s veto “do not directly relate to the wholly separate area of employee 
activities that affect the public’s view of a governmental agency in a negative fashion, and, 
thereby, affect the agency’s mission.” Id. at 928–29. 
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off-duty speech that referenced neither their employer specifically 
nor law enforcement generally. The Second Circuit, for example, 
denied an officer’s First Amendment challenge to his discharge for 
mailing anonymous racist materials to various nonprofit organizations 
that had sent him fundraising solicitations, finding the termination 
justified to prevent the public from otherwise associating the officer’s 
views with the police department as a whole.64 The panel majority 
expressed concern not about the employee’s own performance 
(indeed, the officer was assigned to a computer position that did not 
require public interaction) but instead about public perceptions of the 
rest of the department that could undermine the agency’s 
effectiveness: 
For a New York City police officer to disseminate leaflets that 
trumpet bigoted messages expressing hostility to Jews, ridiculing 
African Americans and attributing to them a criminal disposition to 
rape, robbery, and murder, tends to promote the view among New 
York’s citizenry that those are the opinions of New York’s police 
officers. The capacity of such statements to damage the effectiveness 
of the police department in the community is immense.65 
In sum, courts increasingly defer to government employers’ claims 
that their expressive interests may be imperiled by their workers’ off-
duty speech.66 
To be sure, government’s expressive claims are at times 
substantial, as is the case with police departments’ interest in credibly 
communicating their commitment to evenhanded law enforcement 
regardless of race. But absent limitation, courts’ unexamined 
deference to government in these cases portends deeply troubling 
                                                     
 64. Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 146–48 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 65. Id. at 147; see also Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding 
the firing of police officers and firefighters who engaged in mocking racial stereotypes in an off-
duty holiday parade); Weicherding v. Riegel, 981 F. Supp. 1143, 1148 (C.D. Ill. 1997) 
(“Permitting a sergeant affiliated with the Klan to remain [employed by a state correctional 
center] could send the message that the facility condones or even supports the philosophy of the 
Klan. This could further exacerbate racial tensions in the prison and in the community.”). 
 66. See Locurto, 447 F.3d at 179 (“[T]he disruption need not be actual; the Government 
may legitimately respond to a reasonable prediction of disruption.”); see also Waters v. 
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e have consistently given greater 
deference to government predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than 
to predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large. Few of the 
examples we have discussed involve tangible, present interference with the agency’s 
operation.”). 
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implications for public employees’ free speech rights.67 If 
unconstrained, this trend would permit government agencies to fire 
workers for any unpopular or controversial off-duty speech to which 
the public (or the courts) might object, such as politically volatile 
opinions, 68 or sexually explicit speech that courts find “sleazy.”69 
II.  GOVERNMENT’S EXPRESSIVE INTEREST IN ITS EMPLOYEES’ 
ON-DUTY SPEECH 
As described above, courts increasingly defer to government’s 
expressive claims without examining when and why government 
expression appropriately merits governmental control free from First 
Amendment scrutiny. To fill this gap, this Part first explores the 
theoretical and practical foundations of the government speech 
doctrine, which exempts government’s own expression from First 
Amendment scrutiny. It then critiques the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Garcetti as reflecting a distorted understanding of government 
speech that overstates government’s communicative claims to its 
employees’ on-duty speech while undermining the public interest in 
transparent governmental speech.70 
A. The Government Speech Doctrine and Its Purposes 
As Thomas Emerson was among the first to explain, government 
must express itself if it is to govern effectively: 
[Government speech] enables the government to inform, explain, 
and persuade—measures especially crucial in a society that attempts 
to govern itself with a minimum use of force. Government 
participation also greatly enriches the system; it provides the facts, 
                                                     
 67. See Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process Solution to a 
First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 133 (criticizing San Diego as “allow[ing] 
public employers to punish some off-duty speech that is ideologically obnoxious to them even 
without any impact on or link to its particular operations”). 
 68. See Dible, 515 F.3d at 933–34 (Canby, J., concurring) (“A measureable segment of the 
population, for example, is vigorously antagonistic to homosexual activity and expression; it 
could easily be encouraged to mobilize were a police officer discovered to have engaged, off 
duty and unidentified by his activity, in a Gay Pride parade, or expressive cross-dressing, or any 
number of other expressive activities that might fan the embers of antagonism smoldering in a 
part of the population.”). 
 69. See id. at 928 (majority opinion). 
 70. I earlier criticized Garcetti as a flawed government speech decision in an essay for the 
University of North Carolina’s First Amendment Law Review symposium, Public Citizens, 
Public Servants: Free Speech in the Post-Garcetti Workplace. See Helen Norton, Government 
Workers and Government Speech, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 75, 83–88 (2008). 
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ideas, and expertise not available from other sources. In short, 
government expression is a necessary and healthy part of the 
system.71 
Government speech is thus ubiquitous and necessary. Moreover, 
it valuably furthers citizens’ capacity to participate in democratic self-
governance by enabling them to identify and assess their 
government’s priorities and performance.72 Consider, for example, the 
insights into government policymaking provided to the public during 
the Vietnam War by the Pentagon Papers (a Department of Defense 
study that reviewed U.S. military and diplomatic policy in 
Indochina)73 and, more recently, by the Department of Justice’s legal 
memoranda outlining the Bush administration’s views on the scope of 
executive power in the war against terrorism.74 Government 
expression thus carries great instrumental value because it offers its 
listeners important information that furthers the public’s ability to 
evaluate its government.75 Government speech also facilitates 
                                                     
 71. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 697–98 (1970) 
(“[Government speech] takes the form of oral communications, such as speeches, statements, 
press conferences, and fireside chats, as well as written communications, such as pamphlets, 
books, periodicals, and other publications. It utilizes all available media, including printing 
presses, radio and television, motion pictures, and still pictures, and it achieves its dramatic 
effects through confrontations in hearings, investigations, and debates.”); see also Robert C. 
Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 
UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1825 (1987) (“[I]t is probably not too outlandish an exaggeration to 
conclude that government organizations would grind to a halt were the Court seriously to 
prohibit viewpoint discrimination in the internal management of speech.”); Steven Shiffrin, 
Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 606 (1980) (“If government is to secure cooperation 
in implementing its programs, if it is to be able to maintain a dialogue with its citizens about 
their needs . . . government must be able to communicate.”). 
 72. Shiffrin, supra note 71, at 604 (“Governments, then, can justify subsidizing the speech 
of public officials, not to reelect them or others, but because there is a substantial interest in 
hearing what they have to say. . . . [T]he public would have the advantage of knowing the 
collective judgment of the legislature and of knowing the views of its representatives, which 
would in turn be useful for evaluating them.”). 
 73. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (rejecting 
the government’s efforts to stop publication of the Pentagon Papers). 
 74. See, e.g., Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Nov. 6, 2001), 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/commissions.pdf. 
 75. Government speech is by no means the only type of expression that derives its 
constitutional salience primarily, if not exclusively, from its instrumental value in facilitating 
listeners’ informed decisionmaking. See Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First 
Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1268 (2005) (“[A] large number of the widely accepted 
justifications for freedom of speech are about the social and not individual value of granting to 
individuals an instrumental right to freedom of speech.”). Commercial speech, for example, 
receives constitutional protection because of its value to recipients. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 
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significant First Amendment interests in sharing knowledge and 
discovering truth by informing the public on a wide range of topics.76 
As an illustration, recall the Surgeon General’s groundbreaking 1964 
report on the dangers of tobacco.77 
Because government speech is so important to a thriving 
democracy, the constitutional standards for evaluating government’s 
control of its own speech differ dramatically from those that apply to 
the government’s regulation of private expression. On one hand, 
government cannot discriminate on the basis of viewpoint when 
regulating private speech unless its action satisfies the demanding 
requirements of strict scrutiny.78 On the other, government’s own 
speech “is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny,”79 leaving the 
government generally free to adopt and deliver whatever message it 
chooses when it speaks on its own behalf.80 Political accountability, 
rather than the Free Speech Clause, provides the recourse for those 
unhappy with their government’s expressive choices. 
                                                                                                                          
U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (“[C]ommercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, 
nature, and prices of products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the 
allocation of resources in a free enterprise system. In short, such speech serves individual and 
societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking.” (citations omitted)); Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976) (holding 
that commercial speech is entitled to some constitutional protection because the “consumer’s 
interest in the free flow of commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than 
his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”). 
 76. See Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2000) 
(“[G]overnment speech can help foster debate, fleshing out views, and leading toward a more 
educated citizenry and a better chance of reaching the right answer.”); Shiffrin, supra note 71, at 
569 (“[S]peech financed or controlled by government plays an enormous role in the marketplace 
of ideas.”). 
 77. See PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, PUB. NO. 1103, 
SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL 
OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 25–32 (1964), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ 
NN/B/B/M/Q/_/nnbbmq.pdf (describing the adverse health effects of smoking). 
 78. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (recounting the First 
Amendment’s bar on government’s viewpoint-based discrimination against private speech); 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992) (same). Governmental restraints on 
speech only rarely survive strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) 
(upholding the government’s ban on campaign speech within 100 feet of polling places); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23–38 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding caps on campaign 
contributions). 
 79. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (characterizing the 
Department of Agriculture’s campaign promoting beef products as government speech). 
 80. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (“The Free Speech 
Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government 
speech.”); Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) (distinguishing the 
government’s legitimate exercise of control over the views it itself expresses from the 
government’s impermissible efforts to control the views expressed by private speakers). 
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The value of government speech turns primarily on its 
transparency,81 rather than on its popularity or even its truthfulness.82 
Indeed, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, both controversial 
and inaccurate views are not only unavoidable in a full and free public 
debate, but they often enhance the debate’s quality.83 The First 
Amendment thus poses no bar to government’s own ability to express 
the view, for example, that climate change is not the result of human 
behavior or that Iraq harbors weapons of mass destruction;84 nor 
should it bar government’s decision to engage employees specifically 
to help deliver these views, and to discipline them if they undermine 
its delivery. In these cases, the government’s transparent expressive 
choices not only expose its priorities and inform voter decisions, but 
also spur those with other views to “unearth and disseminate facts 
that deepen the understanding of both speakers and listeners.”85 
Although the First Amendment does not demand that the 
government’s speech be factually correct, note that other 
constitutional,86 statutory,87 or moral constraints may require such 
accuracy. 
                                                     
 81. In contrast to the emphasis on transparency in the government speech context, speech 
by anonymous private actors can be quite valuable indeed. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 337 (1995) (striking down Ohio’s ban on the distribution of unsigned 
political leaflets). 
 82. See Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of 
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 990 (“As a general matter, the First 
Amendment does not require the speech of the state to be truthful and not misleading . . . .”). 
 83. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–73 (1964) (describing the value of 
false speech in spurring contributions to the marketplace of ideas); see also Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 n.2 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“We have nothing to fear 
from the demoralizing reasonings of some, if others are left free to demonstrate their 
errors . . . .” (quoting Thomas Jefferson)). 
 84. See Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and 
Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1133 (2006) (finding no First 
Amendment bar to government misrepresentations about Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass 
destruction). 
 85. Mark Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom of Expression, 16 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1203, 1203 (2009) (“False speech, therefore, is valuable because it is an essential 
part of a larger system that works to increase society’s knowledge.”). 
 86. Congress, for example, as part of its inherent investigative and oversight authority, has 
the constitutional power to compel the truthful testimony of executive branch officials (and 
others). See generally Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 435 (1977) (describing Congress’s 
inherent contempt powers); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (same). 
 87. See, e.g., Note, Avoidance of an Election or Referendum when the Electorate Has Been 
Misled, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1078–82 (1957) (describing statutes requiring truth in the 
government’s statements accompanying propositions submitted to voters). 
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Constitutional constraints other than the Free Speech Clause 
may still limit governmental speech. For example, government 
expression that endorses religion may violate the Establishment 
Clause, and government speech that furthers race, national origin, or 
gender discrimination may violate the Equal Protection Clause.88 
Moreover, although the government does not violate the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause when it prevents private speakers 
from joining or altering its own speech,89 I join those who conclude 
that government generally90 possesses no First Amendment rights of 
its own,91 leaving legislatures free to enact laws limiting government 
                                                     
 88. See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964) (striking down, on equal protection 
grounds, Louisiana’s law requiring that political candidates be racially identified on all ballots 
and nominating papers, and stating that “by placing a racial label on a candidate at the most 
crucial stage in the electoral process—the instant before the vote is cast—the state furnishes a 
vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to operate against one group because of 
race and for another”); Greene, supra note 76, at 37–38 (describing government speech that 
may violate the Equal Protection or Establishment Clauses, but not the Free Speech Clause). 
 89. In Hohfeldian terms, government may be understood as possessing not a right but a 
privilege to its own speech. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 38–44 (1913) (distinguishing 
“rights” from “privileges”); Frederick Schauer, Hohfeld’s First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 914, 914 (2008) (“Existing First Amendment doctrine takes a rather clear position with 
respect to the Hohfeldian structure: a First Amendment right is a right against the government 
and only against the government.”). 
 90. Note that the Court has suggested that certain institutions with unique communicative 
functions—such as universities or broadcasters—may have First Amendment interests 
regardless of their public or private character. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. 
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (noting public and private broadcasters’ First Amendment 
interests in journalistic freedom); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) 
(observing that universities’ academic freedom is “a special concern of the First Amendment”). 
 91. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The First Amendment protects the press from governmental 
interference; it confers no analogous protection on the Government.”); MARK G. YUDOF, 
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 
42–43 (1983) (arguing that government does not possess First Amendment free speech rights); 
Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. 
REV. 1377, 1501–08 (2001) (arguing that recognizing government’s own First Amendment rights 
is inconsistent with constitutional text and purpose). But see United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 
539 U.S. 194, 211 (2003) (declining to decide whether government entities have First 
Amendment rights); id. at 225 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to recognize public 
libraries as First Amendment rightsholders). Moreover, for arguments that state governments 
may assert First Amendment rights against federal efforts to regulate their speech, see generally 
David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1637 (2006); 
Matthew C. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives and Free Speech: The First 
Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999). 
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speech. Indeed, legislatures often do so—for example, by prohibiting 
government from engaging in electioneering speech.92 
Government’s claim to speech arises most frequently as a 
defense to First Amendment challenges by private speakers who seek 
to alter or join what the government contends is its own expression. 
Consider the following dispute as just one illustration:93 A public 
school board passed a resolution opposing pending school voucher 
legislation and authorizing public communication of its opposition—
along with a variety of materials supportive of its stance—on the 
district’s website, as well as in e-mails and letters to parents and 
                                                     
 92. See EMERSON, supra note 71, at 708–09 (“[T]he government can restrict its own 
expression, or that of its agents (aside from their own private expression), without invading any 
First Amendment right.”); KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PUBLIC RELATIONS 
AND PROPAGANDA: RESTRICTIONS ON EXECUTIVE AGENCY ACTIVITIES 5 (2005) (describing 
various congressional appropriations laws that prohibit agencies’ use of funds for “publicity or 
propaganda purposes”); YUDOF, supra note 91, at 170, 302 (describing statutory restrictions on 
government’s partisan speech); Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. 
L. REV. 373, 376 n.18 (1983) (reviewing YUDOF, supra note 91) (discussing statutory and 
guarantee clause limits on official partisanship); Edward H. Ziegler, Government Speech and the 
Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C. L. REV. 578, 586–98, 605 n.169 (1980) 
(same). 
 93. For another example, consider the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pleasant Grove 
City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). There, both the government and a private party 
asserted that privately donated, permanent monuments in public parks reflected their own 
expression. Id. at 1129–30. The Court ruled for the government, concluding that “[p]ermanent 
monuments displayed on public property typically represent government speech.” Id. at 1132. 
  As yet another example, states increasingly claim the messages displayed on specialty 
license plates as their own expression. Such claims have been met with mixed success in the 
courts because the circuits have split in their characterizations of specialty license plates as 
governmental or private speech. The Sixth Circuit, for example, concluded that Tennessee’s 
issuance of a “Choose Life” license plate reflected the legislature’s own pro-life views and thus 
constituted government speech within the state’s power to control; it thus rejected the ACLU’s 
First Amendment challenge to the state’s refusal of its request for a “Pro-Choice” plate. ACLU 
of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 379–80 (6th Cir. 2006). In contrast, the Fourth, Eighth, and 
Ninth Circuits have characterized the same plates as predominantly private expression, 
upholding First Amendment challenges to states’ refusal to issue plates with competing 
messages. See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867–68 (8th Cir. 2009); Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. 
Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008) (upholding the 
Arizona Life Coalition’s challenge to Arizona’s denial of its proposed “Choose Life” plate); 
Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 2004) (upholding Planned 
Parenthood’s First Amendment challenge to South Carolina’s decision to issue a “Choose Life” 
but not a “Pro-Choice” plate). The Seventh Circuit concluded that specialty license plates do 
not constitute government speech, but it upheld the state’s rejection of a “Choose Life” plate as 
a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral regulation of a nonpublic forum to ensure the appearance of 
government neutrality on abortion. Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863–67 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
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school employees.94 A proponent of the legislation then requested 
that he be allowed to post his pro-voucher materials on the district’s 
website, and that he also be allowed to use the school’s 
communication channels to distribute his pro-voucher materials to 
the school community.95 When the district declined, he filed suit, 
arguing that his exclusion constituted viewpoint discrimination in 
violation of the First Amendment.96 The school district successfully 
defended on the ground that the government speech doctrine permits 
it to communicate its own viewpoint without any obligation to allow 
others to join or distort that expression.97 
Courts often struggle with cases like these.98 Although the 
Supreme Court has yet to announce a definitive test for identifying 
government speech,99 it highlighted two factors as key to its 
characterization of a promotional campaign as government speech in 
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n:100 whether the government 
established the overall message to be communicated and whether the 
government approved “every word” of the message ultimately 
disseminated.101 Lower courts continue to rely on these and other 
factors when characterizing speech as private or governmental.102 
                                                     
 94. See Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 278–79 (4th Cir. 2008). In 
the interest of full disclosure, I served pro bono as counsel of record to amici in support of 
respondent school board in this case upon appeal. See Brief of Amici National School Boards 
Ass’n et al., in Support of Affirmance, Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, (4th Cir. 2008) 
(No. 07-1697). 
 95. Page, 531 F.3d at 277. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 285. 
 98. But not always. See Pleasant Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 1132 (“There may be situations in 
which it is difficult to tell whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is 
providing a forum for private speech, but this case does not present such a situation.”). 
 99. 2 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 19:25.50 (2007) (“The Supreme 
Court in Johanns did not offer a comprehensive analytical definition of ‘government speech.’”). 
 100. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005). 
 101. Id. at 562; see also id. at 553 (“The Beef Promotion and Research Act of 
1985 . . . announces a federal policy of promoting the marketing and consumption of ‘beef and 
beef products,’ using funds raised by an assessment on cattle sales and importation. The statute 
directs the Secretary of Agriculture to implement this policy by issuing a Beef Promotion and 
Research Order (Beef Order or Order), and specifies four key terms it must contain . . . .” 
(citations omitted)). 
 102. A number of lower courts have synthesized various appellate decisions to create a four-
factor test for characterizing speech as private or governmental: “(1) the central ‘purpose’ of the 
program in which the speech in question occurs; (2) the degree of ‘editorial control’ exercised by 
the government or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the ‘literal 
speaker’; and (4) whether the government or the private entity bears the ‘ultimate 
responsibility’ for the content of the speech.” Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of 
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I have urged elsewhere that a public entity seeking to claim the 
government speech defense in disputes like these should establish 
that it expressly claimed the speech as its own when it authorized the 
communication and that onlookers understood the speech as the 
government’s at the time of its delivery.103 By identifying two points at 
which government must expose its expressive choices, this approach 
maximizes opportunities for the public to engage in undeceived 
credibility assessments and meaningful political accountability 
measures. First, requiring that government identify itself as the source 
of a message at the time of its creation forces government to 
articulate, and thus think carefully about, its expressive decisions. It 
also prevents after-the-fact manufacture of a government speech 
defense as an opportunistic reaction to thwart those challenging 
government’s regulation of what is in fact private speech. Second, 
requiring the government to be functionally identifiable as the source 
of the message at the time of its delivery (which may take place some 
time after its authorization) further enhances the public’s ability to 
evaluate the message’s credibility and to hold the government 
accountable if it finds the message objectionable. 
Because accountability efforts like petitioning and voting, rather 
than the First Amendment, remain the appropriate check on 
government speech, this approach emphasizes that government 
speech is most valuable and least dangerous when members of the 
public can identify the government as its source. If, on the other hand, 
the expression’s government source is obscured because the 
government fails to identify the speech as its own either formally or 
functionally, then political accountability provides no meaningful 
safeguard. In that case, traditional First Amendment analysis (along 
                                                                                                                          
Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Wells v. City & County 
of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2001). The continuing vitality of this four-factor test 
remains uncertain after Johanns. See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 963 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008) (noting that “[t]here is some question as to what 
standard we should apply in differentiating between private and government speech” and 
concluding that Johanns is distinguishable but instructive); ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 
F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir. 2006) (suggesting that the four-part test might have been overtaken by 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Johanns). 
 103. See Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s 
Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 591–92 (2008). For other commentators’ thoughtful discussion of 
the challenges posed by competing government and private claims to contested speech, see 
generally Bezanson & Buss, supra note 91; Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech 
Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who’s 
Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35 (2002); 
Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005). 
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with its suspicion of viewpoint-based distinctions) should then apply 
to any government constraints on the contested expression. 
Under this approach, the school board’s website and e-mails 
discussed above should be considered speech that the First 
Amendment permits the government to control as its own.104 There 
the board publicly opposed pending legislation, and then 
communicated its opposition in e-mails, letters, and website postings 
that expressly identified their governmental origins.105 In so doing, the 
board provided the public with valuable information about the 
opinions of a public education body on proposed education policy. 
Members of the public in disagreement could then seek to elect new 
board members. 
But the Supreme Court has too often characterized speech as 
governmental without requiring government to signal the origin of its 
speech in a way that allows the public meaningfully to evaluate the 
message and its source. Consider, for example, Rust v. Sullivan,106 in 
which the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to federal 
regulations that barred family planning clinics from making any 
mention of abortion when providing federally funded counseling and 
referrals.107 Although at the time it couched its holding in 
unconstitutional conditions terms,108 the Court later described Rust as 
a government speech case: the government had made the expressive 
choice to promote only some types of family planning, and was thus 
free not only to express that view directly, but also to pay others—
like clinic workers—to express that view on the government’s 
behalf.109 
                                                     
 104. The Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion after applying the Johanns factors 
described above. See Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 285 (4th Cir. 
2008). The court distinguished the board’s actions—in which it made clear its stance, and linked 
and cited to other materials that supported its position—from the creation of a chat room or 
other forum for the ventilation of individual views. See id. at 284 (“Had a linked website 
somehow transformed the School District’s website into a type of ‘chat room’ or ‘bulletin board’ 
in which private viewers could express opinions or post information, the issue would, of course, 
be different.”). 
 105. Id. at 278–79. 
 106. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 107. Id. at 191. 
 108. Id. at 198–99. 
 109. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“The Court in Rust did not 
place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X 
amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we 
have explained Rust on this understanding.”). 
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The First Amendment permits government to choose to 
advocate a pro-life or a pro-choice view—or none at all110—because 
these choices provide the public with valuable information about its 
government. As a practical matter, this means that the First 
Amendment permits government to pay employees or other agents to 
help it deliver its chosen message.111 But if the expression is to be 
characterized as government speech exempt from First Amendment 
scrutiny, the expression should be delivered in a way that allows the 
public to understand it as their government’s viewpoint, so that the 
message’s recipients can more accurately assess its credibility and 
voters may hold the government accountable for that viewpoint. 
The contested regulations in Rust, however, did not require that 
the expression’s governmental origins be disclosed;112 the doctors, 
nurses, and other clinic employees who provided the counseling were 
advised to respond to abortion-related requests simply by saying that 
“the project does not consider abortion an appropriate method of 
family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for 
abortion.”113 As commentators have observed, patients might well 
misunderstand health care professionals to be offering their own 
independent counsel, rather than speaking as agents required to 
convey the government’s view that abortion is not a method of family 
planning to be discussed.114 Because health professionals may be 
viewed as more credible than the government based on public 
perception of their expertise and objectivity, patients may have been 
misled into evaluating the counseling differently than they would 
have if the speakers had made clear its governmental source. 
                                                     
 110. Government’s decision to remain neutral on a particular topic may reflect a strategic 
decision to conserve limited political capital or to reserve judgment on a controversy as the 
public debate continues; in any event, that decision also provides the public with valuable 
information about its government’s expressive choices. 
 111. See Frederick Schauer, Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 84, 100 (1998) (“[T]he state cannot literally speak, but can speak only through 
the voices of others . . . .”). 
 112. Rust, 500 U.S. at 180 (explaining that employees of clinics receiving federal funding 
were “expressly prohibited from referring a pregnant woman to an abortion provider, even 
upon specific request”). 
 113. Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5)). Although the regulations did not require that the 
government be identified as the message’s source, the majority observed that “[n]othing in [the 
Title X regulations] requires a doctor to represent as his own any opinion that he does not in 
fact hold.” Id. at 200. 
 114. See, e.g., Bezanson & Buss, supra note 91, at 1394–96 (arguing that patients could 
mistakenly attribute the government’s views to their doctors); Robert C. Post, Essay, Subsidized 
Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 172–75 (1996) (same). 
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Expressly signaling the message’s governmental origins, in contrast, 
would have permitted listeners to evaluate its quality more 
accurately, as well as to engage in political accountability measures if 
they thought it appropriate to do so.115 Rust thus illustrates the danger 
of treating expression that the government fails transparently to claim 
as its own as government speech free from First Amendment 
scrutiny.116 
B. When Should the First Amendment Be Understood to Permit the 
Government to Claim—And Thus Control—the On-Duty Speech 
of Its Employees as Its Own? 
As described above, the Garcetti rule works as a bludgeon 
against public employee speech when a scalpel offers a more 
appropriate tool for parsing government’s legitimate expressive 
interests in its workers’ on-duty speech. Because government speech 
is most valuable and least dangerous when its governmental source is 
apparent, the First Amendment should instead be understood to 
permit government to claim as its own—and thus control as 
government speech free from First Amendment scrutiny—only the 
speech of public employees that it has specifically hired to deliver a 
particular viewpoint that is transparently governmental in origin and 
thus open to the public’s meaningful credibility and accountability 
checks.117 This is the case, for example, when a school board hires a 
press secretary or lobbyist to promote its anti-voucher position, a 
health department hires an employee to implement an antismoking 
promotional effort, a government clinic hires a counselor to advocate 
methods of family planning other than abortion, a school hires an 
educator to implement its abstinence-only youth campaign, an 
                                                     
 115. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 384 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting 
tobacco companies’ First Amendment challenge to California’s surtax on cigarettes that paid for 
a public health campaign criticizing the tobacco industry when the advertisements bore the 
transparently governmental tagline “Sponsored by the California Department of Health 
Services”). 
 116. For a more recent example of the Supreme Court’s failure to insist on functional 
transparency as a requirement of government speech, see Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 
544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005). That case characterizes beef advertisements authorized by Congress 
and developed under the supervision of the Secretary of Agriculture as government speech even 
though they did not indicate—and in fact obscured—their governmental origins to viewers; the 
ads bore only the tagline “Funded by America’s Beef Producers.” Id. at 555. 
 117. This formulation is also consistent with the factors identified by the Johanns Court as 
salient to a government speech inquiry because this formulation requires that the government 
first “establish” the message to be communicated by the employee, as well as control its 
ultimate delivery. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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agriculture department hires a marketer to extol the benefits of beef, 
or a mayor commissions a muralist specifically to create patriotic art 
for the Fourth of July or art promoting equality to celebrate Dr. 
Martin Luther King’s birthday. Each of these examples demonstrates 
the value of government speech, revealing to the public the 
expressive choices of the government and enabling voters to evaluate 
the message’s credibility and take accountability measures as 
appropriate. As a result, government should be permitted to fire or 
otherwise discipline an employee hired to deliver such a transparently 
governmental message who carries out her communicative duties in a 
way that garbles, distorts, contradicts, or otherwise undermines that 
message. 
In other words, courts should not apply traditional First 
Amendment analysis when they are convinced that the government 
itself is speaking—but courts should only be so convinced when the 
government transparently exposes its views. This approach, of course, 
describes a much smaller slice of public employee speech than does 
Garcetti’s “pursuant to official duties” test.118 By treating as utterly 
unprotected any public employee’s speech delivered pursuant to that 
worker’s official duties, the Garcetti majority ignored the theoretical 
foundations of government speech as exempt from First Amendment 
scrutiny only because of its instrumental value to the public as 
listeners. As dissenting Justice Souter made clear, the public’s interest 
in what Mr. Ceballos had to say about law enforcement in no way 
diminished because he uttered those views pursuant to his official 
duties—indeed, the public interest may be enhanced because of his 
proximity and expertise as a deputy district attorney.119 
In this way, Garcetti fails to recognize that expression constitutes 
government speech exempt from First Amendment scrutiny only 
when it enhances listeners’ ability to evaluate their government. The 
Court instead distinguished speech that the government has paid its 
employees or agents to deliver—and remains free to control—from 
speech delivered by those individuals in their private capacities: 
“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
                                                     
 118. As discussed supra, Garcetti is not the first of the Court’s decisions to ignore the 
theoretical foundations of government speech—Rust and Johanns treated government speech 
similarly. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 119. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 430 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that 
Garcetti’s new “official duties” rule protects internal employee reports of a school’s racist hiring 
practices when made by a teacher but not by a personnel manager, even though the distinction 
matters not to the expression’s value to the public). 
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duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes . . . .”120 It thus indicated that the government 
“owns,” for First Amendment purposes, speech for which it paid, 
permitting governmental bodies to “exercise . . . employer control 
over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.”121 
But a thoughtful application of this principle requires a deeper 
analysis of what the government employer has “bought.” As Justice 
Souter observed in dissent, the prosecutor’s office in Garcetti hired 
Mr. Ceballos not to deliver a specific government viewpoint about the 
infallibility of the police department’s factual assertions, but instead 
to provide sound legal analysis and competent prosecution.122 Yet the 
Court required no evidence that the government had received 
anything other than the proficient legal work and judgment for which 
it had paid.123 
Lower courts now routinely apply the expedited review offered 
by Garcetti to dispose of government workers’ First Amendment 
claims at great cost to the public’s interest in government 
transparency124—precisely the value that the government speech 
doctrine seeks to protect. Indeed, public entities frequently hire 
workers specifically to flag dangerous or illegal conditions, yet 
Garcetti empowers the government to punish them for delivering just 
“what the employer itself has commissioned.”125 Although 
government can and should be held politically accountable for its 
                                                     
 120. Id. at 421 (majority opinion). 
 121. Id. at 422. 
 122. See id. at 437 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Unlike the doctors in Rust, Ceballos was not 
paid to advance one specific policy among those legitimately available, defined by a specific 
message or limited by a particular message forbidden.”). As the Court has observed, the 
prosecution’s interest “is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” Berger v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 123. See Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights That Work at Work: From the First 
Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 1475 (2007) (“[T]he claim rejected in 
Garcetti was as much about fairness, and about vindicating the employee’s reasonable 
expectations about what the job required (and presumably therefore permitted him to do), as it 
was about his liberties.”). 
 124. See Boyce v. Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007) (Birch, J., concurring) (“In 
Garcetti, the Court has built upon Pickering and succeeding cases to give lower federal courts a 
distinction in analysis that expedites review of First Amendment, retaliation cases involving 
government employees . . . .”). 
 125. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422. Professor Rosenthal urges that “[a]n employee called 
upon to speak as part of his duties . . . is not exercising a ‘liberty’ interest” because such speech 
“is supposed to be performed in a manner consistent with management’s wishes.” Lawrence 
Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 33, 49 (2008). 
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operational performance as well as for its expressive choices, Garcetti 
treats a wide swath of public employee speech as entirely unprotected 
without any showing of an adverse effect on government operations. 
In fact, the government’s accountability for its performance may well 
be undercut by the carte blanche Garcetti gives government to 
discipline workers who truthfully report irregularities and 
improprieties pursuant to their official duties. In short, rather than 
identifying a theoretically principled approach for capturing the value 
created by empowering government to control its own speech, 
Garcetti instead formalistically imposed a bright-line rule to avoid the 
often-challenging but entirely commonplace task of balancing 
constitutional interests.126 
That the government cannot claim the speech of an employee as 
its own in a particular situation does not mean that that worker’s First 
Amendment claim will necessarily prevail. Public employee 
expression that does not meet this demanding test for government 
speech should continue on to the traditional Pickering/Connick 
balancing of its value against its impact, if any, on government 
efficiency.127 Public employee claims that involve speech on matters of 
public interest should fail under this balancing inquiry when the 
speech is intemperate or inaccurate, or when it distracts the employee 
from performing her job.128 Indeed, speech delivered pursuant to a 
public employee’s official duties carries significant potential to 
undermine governmental efficiency—for example, when the boorish 
                                                     
 126. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen constitutionally 
significant interests clash, resist the demand for winner-take-all . . . .”); Charles W. “Rocky” 
Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1187 (2007) (“Eschewing the prevailing balancing standard 
governing [government employee free speech] claims, the Court adopted a new categorical rule 
banning any constitutional safeguards.”). 
  As the Garcetti majority correctly emphasized, “Supervisors must ensure that their 
employees’ official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote 
the employer’s mission. . . . If Ceballos’ superiors thought his memo was inflammatory or 
misguided, they had the authority to take proper corrective action.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422–23 
(majority opinion). But the Garcetti Court then erred in failing to require the defendant to show 
that Mr. Ceballos’s speech was flawed in any way. Instead, the majority’s bright-line rule treated 
his speech pursuant to his official duties—no matter how temperate, accurate, or otherwise 
sound—as entirely unprotected by the First Amendment. 
 127. See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 128. Before Garcetti’s bright-line rule, courts generally characterized government workers’ 
allegations of unsafe, illegal, or improper behavior as matters of public concern, but reached 
mixed results when weighing the value of that speech against its impact on the government 
employer’s operations depending on its accuracy or tone. See, e.g., Allred, supra note 24, at 62–
63. 
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tone or factual inaccuracy of that speech disrupts workplace 
operations.129 
C. Anticipating Objections 
Subpart II.B urged that the First Amendment should be 
understood to permit government to claim as its own—and thus 
control exempt from judicial scrutiny—only the speech of public 
employees that it has specifically hired to deliver a particular 
viewpoint that is transparently governmental in origin and thus open 
to meaningful credibility and accountability checks by the public. This 
Subpart anticipates and answers some likely objections. 
1. Concerns about Insufficiently Protecting Workers’ Speech.  A 
return to Pickering balancing in most of these cases, as I have 
proposed, means that outcomes cannot be forecast with certainty. 
This may dismay free speech advocates who fear that the 
unpredictability of balancing may chill public employee speech. But 
this uncertainty is greatly preferable, in my view, to workers’ all-too-
certain losses as a result of Garcetti. Under Pickering, government 
employers were free to ignore internal whistleblowing, but had to 
think twice before punishing, and thus also deterring, it. After 
Garcetti, supervisors can discipline such speech with impunity, thus 
chilling valuable expression altogether to the public’s detriment. 
Permitting claims involving contested speech that does not satisfy a 
more calibrated definition of government speech to proceed to a 
balancing inquiry encourages transparency while still attending to 
government’s legitimate efficiency concerns.130 
Moreover, this proposal’s embrace of a slice, however narrow, of 
employees’ on-duty speech that the government may claim as its own 
may trouble those free speech advocates who question the 
                                                     
 129. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 527 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the 
Pickering/Connick balancing test allows employers to discipline employee speech that is 
inflammatory or misguided). 
 130. Moreover, the employee must ultimately prove, as an additional element of her First 
Amendment claim, that her expression was a substantial or motivating factor in her punishment 
by her governmental employer. If she establishes such causation, the government defendant 
may still escape liability by establishing the affirmative defense that it would have taken the 
same action against the plaintiff even absent her speech. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). For an example of this test, in which the court 
concludes that the plaintiff failed to prove that his speech played a role in a school board’s 
decision not to renew his contract, see Samuelson v. LaPorte Community School Corp., 526 F.3d 
1046, 1054 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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appropriateness of any categorical treatment of employee speech as 
entirely the government’s to control.131 But these arguments 
underestimate government’s, and the public’s, substantial interest in 
the effective delivery of transparently governmental speech: because 
this speech is so valuable to the public, government should be 
permitted to protect it. To be sure, some cases may present factual 
challenges in determining whether an employee was indeed hired to 
deliver a transparently governmental viewpoint,132 just as the current 
Garcetti rule itself sometimes presents challenges in determining 
whether an employee’s contested speech actually occurred pursuant 
to her official duties.133 But unless government is willing to articulate 
as its own—and thus be held politically accountable for—a view that 
it hires all employees to promote a message of government 
infallibility, the proposal here would valuably curtail lower courts’ 
post-Garcetti rejection of claims by workers disciplined after 
reporting wrongdoing or other concerns about government 
operations.134 
2. Institutional Competence Concerns.  Even more likely are 
objections from Garcetti’s defenders that this proposal overstates 
courts’ institutional competence to weigh the interests posed by these 
personnel disputes. These commentators support Garcetti as 
promoting a view of accountability that focuses on government’s 
responsibility to the public for its effective operations. Lawrence 
Rosenthal’s thoughtful justification of Garcetti, for example, includes 
the following: 
                                                     
 131. Justice Stevens’s dissent, for example, indicates his support for a rule that would 
require all claims involving employees’ speech on a matter of public interest to proceed to 
balancing. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Dissenting Justice Souter 
apparently agrees, but predicts that “only comment on official dishonesty, deliberately 
unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety” should 
prevail after such balancing. Id. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting). Dissenting Justice Breyer, in 
contrast, would defer to government employers’ judgment in the great majority of cases, 
permitting only employees’ duty-related speech that presents “professional and special 
constitutional obligations” to proceed to balancing. Id. at 447–49 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 132. See Chambers v. Dep’t of the Interior, 515 F.3d 1362, 1365–66, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(discussing the firing of the Chief of the U.S. Park Police following a newspaper interview in 
which she expressed concern about budgetary requests for staffing and understaffing’s adverse 
impact on public security). 
 133. See Christine Elzer, The “Official Duties” Puzzle: Lower Courts’ Struggle with First 
Amendment Protection for Public Employees After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 
367, 367 (2007). 
 134. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
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After all, if the First Amendment were understood to require that 
all speech-related disputes between public employees and their 
superior be referred to binding arbitration overseen by the judiciary, 
then politically accountable officials would be denied effective 
control over public institutions, a result that would seriously 
compromise the First Amendment’s commitment to ensure that the 
functioning of public institutions be subject to effective political 
accountability. Precisely because the electorate is ordinarily entitled 
to judge the performance of public institutions, effective 
accountability demands that responsibility for that performance not 
become fragmented between politically accountable management 
and judicial overseers.135 
As the Garcetti majority explained, “[t]o hold otherwise would be to 
demand permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of 
governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with sound 
principles of federalism and the separation of powers.”136 
I share the view that government accountability should be the 
focus of this endeavor, but I do not agree that the Garcetti rule 
enabling unbridled managerial control over employee speech 
“pursuant to official duties” furthers such accountability. It allows 
elected officials to suppress whistleblowing and other on-the-job 
communications that would otherwise facilitate the public’s ability to 
engage in political accountability measures, thus frustrating a 
meaningful commitment to republican government.137 More 
specifically, judicial deference imposes unacceptable costs to 
accountability when conferred upon government employers who 
control employee speech in a way that undermines, rather than 
facilitates, transparent processes.138 These include government 
                                                     
 135. Rosenthal, supra note 125, at 38. 
 136. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423. 
 137. Relying upon the public to hold government employers politically responsible for firing 
truthful whistleblowers and other employees engaged in valuable speech requires confidence 
that the public will learn about such actions and the underlying speech that triggered them. 
Except for high-profile whistleblowers, this may rarely be the case. See Randy J. Kozel, 
Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1040 (2005) (observing 
that likelihood of political backlash against government officials who discipline employees for 
their speech is “most pronounced when the employee is fairly visible, generally meaning high-
ranking, so that her dismissal causes a stir and creates the prospect of political backlash against 
the firing party”). 
 138. Professor Rosenthal stresses the limited value of such speech to the public employee as 
speaker, urging that “[a]n employee called upon to speak as part of his duties . . . is not 
exercising a ‘liberty’ interest” because such speech “is supposed to be performed in a manner 
consistent with management’s wishes.” Rosenthal, supra note 125, at 49. In contrast, I am 
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employers who fire workers for their speech delivered pursuant to 
their official duties despite (or because of) its great value to the 
public’s informed decisionmaking, or government employers who fail 
to identify the expressive interests they seek to protect in a way that 
furthers political accountability.139 
3. Efficiency Concerns.  Garcetti’s advocates also emphasize the 
efficiencies created by deferring to government employers’ personnel 
decisions.140 The more contextual inquiry proposed here demands 
more of courts and of government litigants than simply applying 
Garcetti’s bright-line rule to acquiesce in government’s managerial 
judgments about official-duty speech. Dissenting Justice Souter, 
however, doubted that the demands of a more speech-protective rule 
were terribly substantial,141 and, as Justice Ginsburg observed in a 
related context, arguments that contextual inquiries will open the 
floodgates of litigation have been “rehearsed and rejected before.”142 
But even if Garcetti’s categorical approach reduces litigation and its 
attendant costs, it does so while imposing substantial costs of its own 
on workers’ free speech rights and the public’s interest in transparent 
government.143 Indeed, as Alexander Meiklejohn explained, the First 
Amendment “does not balance intellectual freedom against public 
                                                                                                                          
especially concerned with the public’s interest in that employee’s speech, especially when that 
employee delivers precisely the speech required by her job duties—for example, speech by 
public safety officers on matters of public safety and law enforcement. 
 139. See Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 273 (4th Cir. 2009) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) 
(“[A]s the state grows more layered and impacts lives more profoundly, it seems inimical to 
First Amendment principles to treat too summarily those who bring, often at some personal 
risk, its operations into public view. It is vital to the health of our polity that the functioning of 
the ever more complex and powerful machinery of government not become democracy’s dark 
lagoon.”). 
 140. See Andrew Bernie, Recent Development, A Principled Limitation on Judicial 
Interference: Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006), 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1047, 1048 
(2007) (defending Garcetti as “a prudent exercise of judicial restraint that avoids the specter of 
judicial micromanagement of governmental affairs”). 
 141. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“First Amendment protection less 
circumscribed than what I would recognize has been available in the Ninth Circuit for over 17 
years, and neither there nor in other Circuits that accept claims like this one has there been a 
debilitating flood of litigation.”). 
 142. Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2613 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 143. Sheldon Nahmod also explains how government’s efficiency interests receive sufficient 
protection through the long-existing doctrines of causation and qualified immunity. See Sheldon 
H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti 
v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 587 (2008). 
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safety.”144 Meiklejohn’s statement remains true if one were to 
substitute the term “litigation costs” for “public safety.” Moreover, 
the Garcetti rule frustrates public safety as well as speaker autonomy 
when it squelches reports of government improprieties and other 
failures. For this reason, the judiciary’s role in protecting 
constitutional interests ranks higher “on a scale of social values”145 
than does an interest in conserving judicial resources at all cost.146 
Furthermore, just as Garcetti’s defenders may underestimate the 
First Amendment costs of its new rule,147 so too may they 
overestimate the efficiency benefits of protecting managerial 
prerogatives. Toni Massaro, among others, contests the notion that 
deference to managerial judgments necessarily promotes efficient 
workplace operations: 
[A] hierarchical model of organizational structure is a poor model 
on which to base a theory of first amendment protection for public 
employees. Available studies suggest that participatory democracy 
within the workplace—including opportunities for employee 
expression—may promote worker satisfaction, increase overall 
workplace efficiency, and even increase employees’ participation in 
political activity outside of work.148 
                                                     
 144. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
68 (1948). 
 145. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 146. See EMERSON, supra note 71, at 571 (“The hazards involved in a court’s making 
determinations of this nature are admittedly formidable. But such a judgment is not totally 
beyond the reach of judicial capacity.”); YUDOF, supra note 91, at 188–90 (describing courts’ 
institutional capacity for and experience in scrutinizing government activities for violations of 
individual rights). 
 147. As philosopher Stephen Lukes explains in another context, “the most effective and 
insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place.” STEVEN LUKES, 
POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 27 (2d ed. 2005); see also EMERSON, supra note 71, at 563–64 
(“Government employees may thus make important contributions to the discussion of public 
issues, and those contributions may become the more vital as the viewpoint of the speaker 
diverges from official policy.”). Unblinking judicial deference to government control of 
employee speech similarly threatens to squelch dissent at great cost. 
 148. Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector 
Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 3, 5 (1987); see also EMERSON, supra note 71, at 564 (“[F]reedom 
of expression on the part of government employees can play an important role in counteracting 
those stultifying forces which customarily pervade bureaucracy. Organizational pressures 
toward dullness and conformity in the public service can perhaps be partly overcome by 
establishing firm principles that encourage, or at least protect, diversity in opinion and 
discussion.”); Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the “Un-American” Labor 
Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1705, 1706 (2004) (“We argue that the law’s suppression of worker voice 
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The proposal articulated here may thus boost government efficiency 
by requiring government to articulate the threat posed to workplace 
operations by an employee’s speech.149 Worker speech that actually 
threatens government efficiency can then be addressed by Pickering’s 
balancing analysis. 
4. The Availability of Nonconstitutional Protections for Public 
Employees’ Speech.  Finally, the Garcetti Court defended its bright-
line rule as posing relatively little cost to the public’s transparency 
interests because statutory and common law remedies may protect 
whistleblowing and similar speech even if the Constitution does not.150 
In short, the majority trusts government to provide meaningful 
nonconstitutional protections for workers’ valuable speech while on 
duty. 
But as Justice Souter explained in his dissent151 and as others 
have confirmed,152 reality fails to support this confidence: such 
protections are incomplete, patchwork, and of decidedly limited 
utility.153 Indeed, in the great majority of the decisions cited above,154 
                                                                                                                          
and efforts to coerce attachment yields a dysfunctional workforce of disloyal and disengaged 
workers who offer relatively low productivity and poor morale.”). 
 149. See David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of 
Individual Rights, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (2005) (explaining “the contributions a rights-
based system can make to the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental activities”). 
 150. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2005). 
 151. Id. at 439–41 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 152. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NATIONAL SECURITY 
WHISTLEBLOWERS 2 (2005) (“[T]he agencies created by Congress to safeguard the rights of 
whistleblowers [] have not in many cases provided the anticipated protections . . . .”); Stephen I. 
Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing After Garcetti, 57 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1531, 1533 (2008) (describing limits of statutory protections for national security 
whistleblowers). 
 153. Federal workers’ First Amendment remedies are already significantly limited. The 
Supreme Court held that federal employees cannot bring claims in federal court for damages for 
violations of their First Amendment rights because Congress provided federal employees with 
an effective alternative remedy under the Civil Service Reform Act. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 
367, 388–90 (1983). Under the Civil Service Reform Act, federal workers seeking to bring a First 
Amendment claim must file an initial appeal of the agency action against them before an 
administrative law judge designated by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). That 
decision may be reviewed by the MSPB itself, and the Board’s decision may be appealed to the 
Federal Circuit. But Professor Paul Secunda’s review of these decisions concluded that federal 
workers’ statutory remedies under the Act are largely meaningless as a practical matter, finding 
that no First Amendment Pickering claim filed by a federal employee against his or her agency 
has ever been successful on the merits before either the MSPB or the Federal Circuit. Paul M. 
Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1101, 1103 
(2008). State and local workers, in contrast, may bring First Amendment and other 
constitutional claims against their employers in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but with 
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lower courts’ application of Garcetti to reject the plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment claims meant the end of the case because no statutory or 
other claims remained available.155 
Nor does the fact that claims involving external whistleblowing 
may survive Garcetti and proceed to balancing (for example, an 
employee’s reports of government misconduct to external media or 
law enforcement agencies that are not considered official duties) 
provide adequate alternative protections. A rule that requires 
employees to raise their concerns to an entity other than their 
employer is both unrealistic and perverse.156 First, it assumes, with 
little foundation, that workers will be brave enough to risk their 
livelihoods to reach out to outside entities that may or may not be 
responsive to their reports. Second, forcing workers to air their 
concerns to outsiders may create substantial inefficiencies of its own, 
raising the public stakes in a way that may lead agencies to harden 
their positions and adopt a defensive posture. This might lower the 
possibility that the agency will simply respond with quick and quiet 
internal corrections. 
                                                                                                                          
limitations (for example, the Eleventh Amendment limits the availability of damages against 
state but not local governments). See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); 
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472–73 (1974). 
 154. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
 155. See, e.g., Callahan v. Fermon, 526 F.3d 1040, 1045 (7th Cir. 2008); Ruotolo v. City of 
New York, 514 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2008); Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 
2007); Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 2007); Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487 F.3d 
506, 509 (7th Cir. 2007); Vila v. Padrón, 484 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2007); Spiegla v. Hull, 481 
F.3d 961, 967 (7th Cir. 2007); Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 
2007); McGee v. Pub. Water Supply, 471 F.3d 918, 920 (8th Cir. 2006); Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 
468 F.3d 755, 761–62 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Sillers v. City of Everman, No. 4:08-CV-055-
A, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39187, at *7 (N.D. Tex. May 13, 2008); Hoover v. County of Broome, 
No. 3:07-cv-0009, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31485, at *20 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008); Baranowski v. 
Waters, No. 05-1379, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21301, at *71 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2008); Maule v. 
Susquehanna Reg’l Police Comm’n, No. 04-CV-05933, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73065, at *40 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2007); Wesolowski v. Bockelman, 506 F. Supp. 2d 118, 121–22 (N.D.N.Y. 
2007); Barclay v. Michalsky, 493 F. Supp. 2d 269, 271 (D. Conn. 2007); Coward v. Gilroy, No. 
3:05-CV-285, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30075, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2007); Linskey v. City of 
Bristol, Civil No. 3:05-cv-872(CFD), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26986, at *13 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 
2007); Richards v. City of Lowell, 472 F. Supp. 2d 51, 80 (D. Mass. 2007); Pagani v. Meriden Bd. 
of Educ., No. 3:05-CV-01115, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92267, at *8 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2006); 
Levy v. Office of the Legislative Auditor, 459 F. Supp. 2d 494, 499 (M.D. La. 2006); Logan v. 
Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:04-cv-0797-SEB-JPG, 2006 WL 1750583, at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 
2006). 
 156. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t seems perverse to fashion a 
new rule that provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before 
talking frankly to their superiors.”); Nahmod, supra note 143, at 580 (discussing inefficiencies 
created by the Garcetti rule). 
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III.  GOVERNMENT’S EXPRESSIVE INTERESTS IN ITS EMPLOYEES’ 
OFF-DUTY SPEECH 
Garcetti treats a public employee’s speech as the government’s 
when that employee speaks pursuant to official duties, but courts also 
increasingly consider government employees to be speaking “as an 
employee” even when off duty. Without expressly invoking the 
vocabulary of government speech, courts frequently permit 
government to control its workers’ off-duty speech to protect its 
ability to communicate its own views. This Part thus focuses on 
situations in which the government seeks to prevent the delivery of a 
message it fears would otherwise be sent by its association with an 
employee who engages in certain speech. It starts by examining the 
foundations underlying that fear. 
A. The Expressive Content of Government’s Association with 
Employees Engaged in Certain Off-Duty Speech 
As described above, courts are increasingly willing to conclude 
that employees’ speech away from work that does not refer to or 
otherwise identify their employment may still affect their 
employment because of these associations.157 Applying the 
Connick/Pickering balancing test, courts then generally defer to 
government’s assertions that its interest in effective workplace 
operations outweighs the plaintiff’s interest in her off-duty speech.158 
A growing body of social science supports courts’ intuition that an 
organization’s association with individuals engaged in certain speech 
can communicate a message that may undermine—or further—the 
organization’s ability to communicate its own views effectively. 
                                                     
 157. On a spectrum of attenuation, government’s concerns about the potentially damaging 
effects of employee speech are most direct when an employee speaks at work about work. Next, 
arguably, is speech at work not about work, followed by speech away from work about work. 
But furthest afield, assuredly, is speech away from work not about work. 
 158. Debate continues over whether the value of the employee’s speech should be measured 
solely in terms of its value to the public in facilitating self-governance or also in terms of its 
value to the employee. The Court, however, values both private speaker and public listener 
interests when assessing the constitutionality of a statute that limits a broad category of speech 
by large numbers of government workers. See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees 
Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468 (1995) (“[T]he Government’s burden is greater with respect to this 
statutory restriction on expression than with respect to an isolated disciplinary action. The 
Government must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of 
present and future employees in a broad range of present and future expression are outweighed 
by that expression’s ‘necessary impact on the actual operation’ of the Government.” (citing 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968))). 
NORTON IN FINAL FINAL 9/3/2009  9:05:16 PM 
42 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1 
Indeed, social science reveals that onlookers often use the views 
of an entity’s associates as a cognitive shortcut, or heuristic, for 
evaluating the entity itself. For example, political science research has 
long confirmed voters’ frequent use of third-party endorsements and 
similar associations as heuristics to help predict a candidate’s own 
views and behavior.159 Voters often judge candidates based on the 
candidates’ friends and relatives,160 just as they frequently use the 
views of interest groups endorsing a candidate to determine the views 
of the actual candidate.161 
Lawrence Lessig has explored similar sorts of expressive 
connections, describing the various techniques for changing a 
message’s meaning based on its associations.162 He describes, for 
example, the technique of “tying,” which involves “attempts to 
transform the social meaning of one act by tying it to, or associating it 
with, another social meaning that conforms to the meaning that the 
architect wishes the managed act to have.”163 Common examples of 
“tying” include celebrity endorsements, but, as Lessig observes: “The 
link can transfer negative as well as positive value. A candidate for 
Congress ties her opponent to the President, hoping that negative 
views about the President will transfer to the opponent.”164 
Whereas the views of endorsers may often accurately predict the 
endorsee’s own views, an emerging body of cognitive and social 
psychology research reveals that observers also frequently use the 
characteristics of a target’s associates as a heuristic for drawing 
conclusions about the target herself in contexts in which such 
conclusions are likely to be inaccurate.165 As one study demonstrated, 
friends, relatives, and roommates of stigmatized persons are more 
                                                     
 159. Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive 
Heuristics in Political Decision Making, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 951, 953 (2001) (describing 
observers’ tendency to ascribe the views of candidates’ associates to candidates themselves). 
 160. SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN 
POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 71 (2d ed. 1994). 
 161. James N. Druckman, Does Political Information Matter?, 22 POL. COMM. 515, 515 
(2005); Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence 
Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1158–59 (2003). 
 162. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1009 
(1995). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See, e.g., Kristina R. Olson et al., Judgments of the Lucky Across Development and 
Culture, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 757, 766 (2008) (concluding, in part, that children 
view targets as lucky or unlucky based on the behavior and experiences of the targets’ family 
associates). 
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likely to experience social rejection themselves simply as the result of 
onlookers’ observation of their relationship with those persons.166 
Observers often form negative impressions of an individual who is 
merely seen in the presence of a person perceived as stigmatized. 
Another study, for example, found that observers rated job applicants 
viewed while seated next to an overweight person more negatively 
than those viewed while seated next to a person of average size. 
Physical proximity alone was sufficient to create negative associations 
because negative perceptions remained even when the observers were 
instructed that the individuals seated next to each other did not know 
each other.167 These findings lend weight to what many already 
suspect: one’s associations with stigmatized persons may lead others 
to view the associated person negatively, too. 
The point here is simply that onlookers often rely upon the 
qualities of an entity’s associates as a heuristic for assessing the 
entity’s own characteristics, not that they are right or wise to do so.168 
Social science thus confirms government’s—and courts’—fear that 
the public will associate the objectionable or otherwise controversial 
off-duty speech of at least some public employees with the 
government that employs them. 
This intuition is far from new. Indeed, the emerging trend 
regarding public employees’ First Amendment claims offers just the 
most recent illustration of courts’ longstanding sense outside of the 
employment setting169 that an institution’s association with individuals 
engaged in certain speech can communicate a message that may 
undermine that institution’s ability to deliver its own views 
effectively.170 For example, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian 
                                                     
 166. Steven L. Neuberg et al., When We Observe Stigmatized and “Normal” Individuals 
Interacting: Stigma by Association, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 196, 206 (1994) 
(concluding that straight male targets were more likely to be denigrated by observers when they 
were seen talking with a gay male friend than with a straight male friend). 
 167. Michelle R. Hebl & Laura M. Mannix, The Weight of Obesity in Evaluating Others: A 
Mere Proximity Effect, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 28, 35 (2003). 
 168. Although beyond the scope of this Article, this troubling reality raises the question of 
whether the law should create incentives for such onlookers to be more discerning in the 
conclusions they draw from such associations. 
 169. The Supreme Court has never ruled on the expressive content, if any, of an 
organization’s employment decisions. In Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), the 
Court found, with very little discussion, that a defendant law firm had failed to demonstrate that 
prohibiting it from sex-based discrimination when making its partnership decisions would 
undermine its expressive choices. Id. at 77. 
 170. Government’s associational choices outside of the employment context may also 
communicate substantive messages, inviting further concerns about their potential expressive 
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and Bisexual Group of Boston,171 a unanimous Court concluded that 
requiring the organizers of a St. Patrick’s Day parade to include a 
group of gay and lesbian Irish Americans marching behind an 
identifying banner would impermissibly force the parade organizers 
to communicate a message of acceptance.172 In so holding, the Court 
predicted that observers would draw certain conclusions about the 
organizers’ views based on their public association with the 
marchers.173 
Courts have also long acknowledged public schools’ similar 
concerns about the expressive content of their associations, ruling 
that the First Amendment permits public schools to regulate student 
speech when the speech occurs in a context that would otherwise 
indicate the school’s imprimatur or endorsement. In Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier,174 for example, the Court upheld a public 
school’s refusal to publish in its newspaper articles discussing student 
experiences with birth control, pregnancy, and divorce.175 
Emphasizing educators’ authority over school-sponsored publications 
“and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members 
of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the 
school,”176 the Court concluded that the school’s action was justified, 
inter alia, by its interest in ensuring that “the views of the individual 
                                                                                                                          
content. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Trademarks of Privilege: Naming Rights and the Physical Public 
Domain, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 919, 932–33 (2007) (“Because a naming gesture imputes social 
meaning to the physical public domain, acts of visible branding can infuse a public facility with 
strong associative values that affect public perceptions and permeate the collective public 
conscience. For example, both residents and outsiders are likely to view a community in which a 
public school is named for Robert E. Lee very differently from a community in which a public 
school is named for Martin Luther King, Jr.”). 
 171. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 172. Id. at 559. 
 173. Id. at 574–75 (“[T]he presence of the organized marchers would suggest [the parade 
organizers’] view that people of their sexual orientations have as much claim to unqualified 
social acceptance as heterosexuals and indeed as members of parade units organized around 
other identifying characteristics. . . . GLIB’s participation would likely be perceived as having 
resulted from the Council’s customary determination about a unit admitted to the parade, that 
its message was worthy of presentation and quite possibly of support as well.”). Similarly, in 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006), the Court 
observed that some such choices are more communicative than others, distinguishing expressive 
decisions about whom to admit as a member or a leader or other insider from what it 
characterized as a law school’s comparatively nonexpressive act of allowing military recruiters 
to use its facilities. Id. at 1309–10 (“Unlike a parade organizer’s choice of parade contingents, a 
law school’s decision to allow recruiters on campus is not inherently expressive.”). 
 174. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 175. Id. at 262–66. 
 176. Id. at 271. 
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speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.”177 Rather than 
claiming the speech at issue as their own,178 the schools in these cases 
assert—and courts often agree—that a school’s association with the 
speaker in a context “so closely connected to the school that it 
appears that the school is somehow sponsoring the speech”179 sends a 
message that the government is entitled to control.180 
Similarly, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,181 a divided Court 
concluded that requiring the Scouts to retain a gay scoutmaster would 
force them to communicate “that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual 
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”182 Even the dissent agreed 
that an organization’s association with a member engaged in speech 
advocating a particular viewpoint could communicate the 
organization’s acceptance of those views.183 The majority and dissent, 
however, sharply differed as to whether Mr. Dale’s status as gay, 
without more, would communicate any substantive message about the 
Scouts’ views.184 Deferring to the Scouts’ own assessment that its 
association with Mr. Dale would impair its communicative interests, 
the majority departed from its approach in earlier expressive 
                                                     
 177. Id. at 271. 
 178. Schools have claimed a wide variety of contested expression as their own. See Chiras v. 
Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2005) (concluding that a school’s choice of textbooks and 
other curricular materials constitutes government speech); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 
228 F.3d 1003, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the contents of a school’s bulletin board 
commemorating Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month reflected the district’s own expression 
even while inviting individuals to join and contribute to it, and thus rejecting a First 
Amendment challenge by a teacher who sought to post materials questioning homosexuality’s 
morality). 
 179. Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 180. Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 370–71 (4th Cir. 1998) (en 
banc); see also Curry ex rel. Curry v. Hensiner, 513 F.3d 570, 577 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008) (“For 
speech to be perceived as bearing the imprimatur of the school does not require that the 
audience believe the speech originated from the school, only that an observer would reasonably 
perceive that the school approved the speech.”). 
 181. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 182. Id. at 653. 
 183. Id. at 702 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“It is certainly possible for an individual to become so 
identified with a position as to epitomize it publicly. When that position is at odds with a group’s 
advocated position, applying an antidiscrimination statute to require the group’s acceptance of 
the individual in a position of group leadership could so modify or muddle or frustrate the 
group’s advocacy as to violate the expressive associational right.”); id. at 694–95 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (emphasizing that “Dale did not carry a banner or a sign; he did not distribute any 
factsheet; and he expressed no intent to send any message”). 
 184. Id. at 697 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is not likely that BSA would be understood to 
send any message, either to Scouts or to the world, simply by admitting someone as a 
member.”). 
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association cases in which it had carefully scrutinized the record for 
evidence of such impairment.185 Indeed, with very little explanation, 
the Dale Court suggested that an organization’s own subjective 
assessment provides the proper measure for determining whether its 
association with a particular individual will actually damage its 
expressive interests—that is, the Court deferred to the Scouts’ 
prediction of such an impairment.186 Contrast this test with the 
approach taken by the unanimous Hurley Court, which instead 
appeared to apply an objective standard, assessing whether a 
reasonable observer would understand the association to undermine 
the organization’s speech.187 In short, both Dale and contemporary 
public employment cases demonstrate courts’ growing deference to 
parties’ assertions that the views of their associates will be ascribed to 
them in ways that will undermine their ability to communicate their 
own views.188 
                                                     
 185. Compare id. at 653 (majority opinion) (“As we give deference to an association’s 
assertions regarding the nature of its expression, we must also give deference to an association’s 
view of what would impair its expression.”), with Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626–27 
(1984) (emphasizing that although the Jaycees had “taken public positions on a number of 
diverse issues, [and] . . . regularly engage[d] in a variety of . . . activities worthy of constitutional 
protection under the First Amendment,” there was “no basis in the record for concluding that 
admission of women as full voting members will impede the organization’s ability to engage in 
these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views”). 
 186. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595, 601 (2001) (characterizing Dale as “totally undermin[ing]” 
Roberts); Tobias Barrington Wolff & Andrew Koppelman, Expressive Association and the Ideal 
of the University in the Solomon Amendment Litigation, 27 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 92, 101–03 
(2008). 
 187. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 575 
(1995); see also Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85–87 (1980) (predicting that 
reasonable observers would not attribute the views of leafleters to the owner of the mall, and 
thus rejecting the mall owner’s First Amendment claim of compelled speech). 
 188. I discuss these cases not to suggest that governmental bodies have their own First 
Amendment rights to expressive association, but instead to illuminate when and under what 
circumstances courts have concluded that certain associations do send a substantive message 
about an organization’s views. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text; see also Paul M. 
Secunda, The Solomon Amendment, Expressive Associations, and Public Employment, 54 
UCLA L. REV. 1767, 1797–98 (2007) (expressing concern that Rumsfeld may be misunderstood 
as suggesting that public law schools have First Amendment rights of expressive association and 
that this misunderstanding would further diminish public employees’ constitutional rights). 
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B. When Should the First Amendment Be Understood to Permit 
Government to Control Its Workers’ Off-Duty Speech to Protect 
Its Own Expression? 
As described above, courts increasingly defer to government’s 
assertion that its association with employees who engage in certain 
off-duty expression undermines its credibility in communicating its 
own contrary views. But unexamined deference to government’s fears 
about onlookers’ reactions to workers’ off-duty speech threatens to 
institutionalize the long-maligned “heckler’s veto”189 as a basis for 
government’s employment actions. Indeed, the colloquy between the 
Ninth Circuit majority and concurrence in Dible v. City of Chandler190 
highlights this tension between government’s employment interests 
and First Amendment values: whereas the majority emphasized the 
damaging effects of an officer’s sexually explicit off-duty speech to 
the police department’s effectiveness,191 the concurrence focused on 
the First Amendment costs of indulging such public reaction.192 
                                                     
 189. See Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 787 
n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The term ‘heckler’s veto’ first appeared in a footnote in Brown v. 
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 n.1 (1966). We use this term to describe restrictions on speech that 
stem from listeners’ negative reactions to a particular message.”). As the Supreme Court has 
made clear in other First Amendment contexts, “[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any 
departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority’s 
opinion may inspire fear.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 
(1969); see also Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970) (“[I]t is firmly settled that under 
our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas 
are themselves offensive to some of their hearers . . . .” (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 
576, 592 (1969))). 
 190. Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 191. Id. at 928 (“[A]s soon as Ronald Dible’s indecent public activities became widely 
known, officers in the department began suffering denigration from members of the 
public . . . .”). 
 192. Id. at 933–34 (Canby, J., concurring) (“A measureable segment of the population, for 
example, is vigorously antagonistic to homosexual activity and expression; it could easily be 
encouraged to mobilize were a police officer discovered to have engaged, off duty and 
unidentified by his activity, in a Gay Pride parade, or expressive cross-dressing, or any number 
of other expressive activities that might fan the embers of antagonism smoldering in a part of 
the population.”); see also Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1001 (4th Cir. 1985) (“Here not 
only was the perceived threat of disruption only to external operations and relationships, it was 
caused not by the speech itself but by threatened reaction to it by offended segments of the 
public. Short of direct incitements to violence by the very content of public employee speech (in 
which case the speech presumably would not be within general first amendment protection), we 
think this sort of threatened disruption by others reacting to public employee speech simply may 
not be allowed to serve as justification for public employer disciplinary action directed at that 
speech.”). 
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To prevent the imposition of a certain orthodoxy of expression 
as a condition of public employment,193 attention to First Amendment 
values requires that the circumstances under which government 
should be permitted to control the off-duty speech of its workers to 
protect its own expression should be rare and well-examined. The 
remainder of this Part explores what this might mean in practice, 
examining both categorical and contextual possibilities that illuminate 
the inescapable trade-offs between bright-line categorical rules and 
flexible multifactor assessments. Although there may be no 
completely satisfying solution, I find both proposals to be preferable 
to the status quo, which is far too deferential to government’s claimed 
expressive interests. On balance, I prefer the contextual approach 
because it better comports with my sense that the threat posed to 
government’s expressive interests varies significantly with the context 
of an employee’s off-duty speech even within certain categories of 
employees closely identified with their governmental roles. 
Before turning to this inquiry, however, several caveats are in 
order. First, I do not contest government’s power to discipline 
workers for their speech—off-duty or otherwise—that is obscene, 
defamatory, or otherwise unprotected by the First Amendment when 
uttered by members of the public generally.194 Nor do I quarrel with 
public entities’ regulation of that limited universe of off-duty speech 
that actually undercuts the plaintiff’s own ability to perform his job 
effectively—for example, a probationary prison guard’s off-duty anti-
Semitic outburst at a bank that signals his own inability to handle 
prisoners’ provocative insults when on the job.195 This Part’s analysis 
                                                     
 193. See Bieluch v. Sullivan, 999 F.2d 666, 673 (2d Cir. 1993) (“To hold otherwise [in a case 
involving the disciplining of a state trooper for off-duty speech on local political controversies] 
would seriously undermine the first-amendment rights of public employees. Whenever a 
government employee became personally involved in a controversial public issue, those on the 
opposite side of the issue could get the employee transferred or discharged simply by expressing 
a concern to the employee’s superior that government functions were being threatened.”). 
 194. Government—whether acting as employer or regulator—remains free to punish speech 
that is unprotected by the First Amendment, such as obscenity or fighting words. See, e.g., 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973) (defining speech that rises to the level of 
obscenity as unprotected); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining 
“‘fighting’ words” as unprotected). This Subpart focuses on employees’ off-duty speech that 
would otherwise be entitled to full First Amendment protection if uttered by an individual not 
employed by the government. 
 195. Hawkins v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 602 A.2d 712, 720 (Md. 1992). In other 
cases, courts similarly agreed that public employees’ off-duty speech adversely affected their 
ability to perform their own jobs. See Piscottano v. Murphy, 511 F.3d 247, 252–53 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(concluding that corrections officers’ association with a motorcycle club with a long history of 
criminal activity undermined their own effective job performance because it jeopardized their 
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focuses instead on the appropriate scope of government’s power to 
control its employees’ off-duty speech that may undermine its ability 
to communicate its own views. Under what circumstances, then, does 
the First Amendment permit government to protect its institutional 
expression by controlling its workers’ off-duty speech? This query 
invites a wide range of possible responses. 
On one end of the spectrum, those most interested in preserving 
government employers’ managerial judgments might treat 
government workers as having waived their free speech rights, 
revisiting Oliver Wendell Holmes’ conclusion that a policeman “may 
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional 
right to be a policeman.”196 The Supreme Court, however, has long 
rejected that rule197 for reasons that remain sound today: requiring 
public employees to relinquish their free speech rights as a condition 
of employment suppresses expression at a great cost to key First 
Amendment values in promoting individual autonomy, contributing 
                                                                                                                          
working relationship with other officers and their ability to work in prisons populated by club 
members and rival club members); Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 189–92 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that the plaintiff’s active membership in an organization that sought “to bring about 
a change in the attitudes and laws governing sexual activity between men and boys. . . . had 
undermined his ability to serve as a teacher” because of students’ and parents’ concerns about 
his ability to perform his job duties); Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 968–73 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(concluding that a police officer’s racially offensive Halloween costume at a Fraternal Order of 
Police lodge damaged his working relationships with fellow officers). For an expression of 
concern that permitting even performance-based dismissals for public employees’ off-duty 
speech poses unacceptable First Amendment costs, see Hawkins, 602 A.2d at 721–27 (Bell, J., 
dissenting). 
  To illustrate further the distinction between performance-based and expression-based 
justifications for government’s discipline of employee speech, consider the military’s prohibition 
of misconduct, including speech, that operates “to the prejudice of good order and discipline” 
(reflecting concern about speech that undermines servicemembers’ actual performance) or that 
is “of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces” (reflecting concern about speech that 
undermines the military’s expression of its own public image). 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2006). Compare 
United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 443–52 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (concluding that a soldier’s 
Internet communications supporting white supremacy violated neither provision), with id. at 
452–62 (Baker, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the facts supported a charge of discrediting the 
armed forces). 
 196. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
 197. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (“To the extent that the Illinois 
Supreme Court’s opinion may be read to suggest that teachers may constitutionally be 
compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to 
comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in 
which they work, it proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in numerous 
prior decisions . . . .”); see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 395 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“The Court long ago rejected Justice Holmes’ approach to the free speech rights of 
public employees . . . .”); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 591–610 (1967) (rejecting 
McAuliffe’s reasoning). 
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to the marketplace of ideas, and facilitating citizen participation in 
democratic self-governance.198 
On the other end of the continuum, one might instead entirely 
deny government the ability to control workers’ off-duty speech.199 
This rule assuredly provides substantial protection for workers’ free 
speech rights, but it fails to acknowledge that government does have 
important expressive interests that may sometimes be imperiled even 
by workers’ off-duty speech: consider, for example, the message sent 
by a police chief who marches with the Klan while off-duty. This Part 
thus continues on to consider alternatives that more fully address and 
thus accommodate the significant interests of employees, government, 
and the public alike, seeking to identify more precisely the universe of 
off-duty speech that actually poses expressive threats to government’s 
own speech. 
1. A Categorical Approach.  Consider the possibility that the 
speech of government workers who serve as the voice or the face of 
the government potentially poses such grave threats to government 
expression to justify government’s control of even their off-duty 
communications. Under this view, certain positions trigger such high 
public expectations that those employees could never escape their 
governmental role to speak purely as private citizens even when off 
the job.200 
                                                     
 198. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation 
and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1411 (1987) (“Most theoretical 
writings have suggested variants of four different values as critical to speech protection: 
individual development, democratic government, social stability, and truth.” (citations 
omitted)); Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAL. L. 
REV. 422, 423 (1980) (“Over the years, we have come to view freedom of expression as essential 
to: (1) individual self-fulfillment; (2) the advance of knowledge and the discovery of truth; (3) 
participation in decisionmaking by all members of society; and (4) maintenance of the proper 
balance between stability and change.”). 
 199. See, e.g., Kozel, supra note 137, at 1010 (proposing “full First Amendment protection to 
employee speech that occurs off the job and is directed at audiences broader than the workplace 
audience, while affording no First Amendment protection to employee speech that occurs on 
the job or is directed solely at workplace audiences”). 
 200. This is something of a twist on social role theory, which posits that individuals often 
shape their behavior to fit the expectations of others with respect to various roles. See, e.g., 
Richard E. Priehs, Appointed Counsel for Indigent Criminal Appellants: Does Compensation 
Influence Effort?, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 57, 59 (1999) (“Role theory posits that the behavior of the 
individual may be shaped by the demands and rules of others . . . .”); June Louin Tapp & Felice 
J. Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1974) 
(arguing that social role theory “portrays the individual as a mirror of others’ expectations”). 
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The off-duty speech of employees hired to represent legislators 
or other governmental officials provides one example.201 As Judge 
Jack B. Weinstein observed with respect to a state legislator’s 
community relations director fired for her off-duty protest of police 
practices that conflicted with the legislator’s professed support for the 
police, the public may be unable to dissociate even the off-duty views 
of such employees from the views of their government employer: 
  To summarize, legislative aides occupying positions in which their 
public speech may reasonably be associated with, or mistaken for, 
that of the legislator’s may constitutionally be dismissed for their 
public speech. This rule applies even if the speech falls outside of the 
aide’s public responsibilities. It is the perceived personal connection 
between legislator and staffer, and the legislator’s resulting concern 
for his constituent relations, that is critical. . . . 
  . . . . The close affiliation of aides and the legislators they serve 
generates a strong public perception of association between the two. 
This naturally leads the public to assume their views are identical. 
  As a result, what legislative aides say may reasonably be 
understood by voters as an expression of the legislator’s position. 
Even where a legislative assistant affirmatively states that a 
particular statement is made in a personal capacity, constituents may 
nonetheless perceive that the views of the aide were sanctioned by 
the legislator.202 
Law enforcement officers likely fall into the category of 
quintessentially public servants.203 The Second Circuit, for example, 
suggested that all speech by public safety officers communicates a 
substantive message about the department as a whole, upholding the 
New York Police and Fire Departments’ firing of several employees 
for their off-duty appearance on a parade float that featured mocking 
stereotypes of African Americans: 
Police officers and firefighters alike are quintessentially public 
servants. As such, part of their job is to safeguard the public’s 
opinion of them, particularly with regard to a community’s view of 
                                                     
 201. Much of the on-duty speech of such employees may be considered government speech 
entirely within the government’s power to control under the approach articulated in Part II, 
because such employees are often hired specifically to deliver the views of the government 
officials they represent. 
 202. Gordon v. Griffith, 88 F. Supp. 2d 38, 50, 57–58 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (citations omitted). 
 203. Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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the respect that police officers and firefighters accord the members 
of that community. . . . 
 . . . . 
  . . . . [P]olice officers and firefighters who deliberately don 
“blackface,” parade through the streets in mocking stereotypes of 
African-Americans and, in one firefighter’s case, jokingly recreate a 
recent vicious hate crime against a black man, might well damage 
the relationship between the [police department] and [fire 
department] and minority communities.204 
Under this view, public safety officers can never shed their roles 
as employees because “part of their job is to safeguard the public’s 
opinion of them”205—a job duty that binds them at all times. Indeed, 
law enforcement agencies have uniquely strong expressive interests 
among government entities because of their reliance upon public trust 
and cooperation for their effectiveness.206 To this end, police 
department codes of conduct and similar constraints often expressly 
signal expectations that govern even officers’ off-duty actions—for 
example, requiring that their conduct be unsullied or beyond 
reproach.207 Similarly, many jurisdictions consider police officers and 
other public safety officials as always on duty.208 Although these 
                                                     
 204. Id. at 178–79, 182. 
 205. Id. at 178. 
 206. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective Restraint in Social Dilemmas: 
Procedural Justice and Social Identification Effects on Support for Authorities, 69 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 482, 482–83 (1995) (concluding that the more trust and 
cooperation a government institution engenders, the more legitimate and thus the more 
effective it becomes). 
  Some courts of appeal continue to cite with approval Holmes’s aphorism that a police 
officer may have a constitutional right to speak, but no constitutional right to be a policeman—
even though the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected Holmes’s approach as inconsistent with 
free speech values. E.g., Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 931 n.9 (9th Cir. 2008); Pappas 
v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 2002). Although those courts’ continuing embrace of 
Holmes’s since-discredited observation may demonstrate a disquieting misunderstanding of 
contemporary First Amendment protections for government workers’ speech, this trend may 
instead simply reflect courts’ intuition that law enforcement agencies have particularly strong 
expressive interests in this context. 
 207. See, e.g., Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 765 (10th Cir. 2008) (describing a 
law enforcement code of ethics requiring officers to “keep [their] private life unsullied as an 
example to all and [to] behave in a manner that does not bring discredit” to the agency); 
Thaeter v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 2006) (describing 
police department code of ethics in which officers pledge to “keep my private life unsullied as 
an example to all”). 
 208. See, e.g., Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 4, 16 (1st Cir. 2005) (characterizing 
department policy as requiring officers to be on duty at all times); Revene v. Charles County 
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regulations do not displace constitutional protections, they do 
illustrate the extent of public expectations triggered by the power and 
discretion conferred upon these officers,209 and this power may well be 
relevant to the appropriate development of constitutional law 
doctrine.210 
Primary and secondary school teachers may also fall within the 
category of quintessentially public servants because they too face 
strong public role expectations that they may not escape even when 
away from work.211 Adeno Addis, for example, has characterized 
teachers, along with parents and peers, as among those figures who 
are expected to model behavior at all times—that is, 
“comprehensively influential individual[s]”—as opposed to the 
majority of workers, who carry merely “role-specific” expectations 
limited to their behavior while on the job.212 Again reflecting these 
expectations, teachers’ codes of conduct also often impose significant 
off-duty restrictions.213 
                                                                                                                          
Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989); Davis v. Murphy, 559 F.2d 1098, 1100–01 (7th Cir. 
1977); Davenport v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 278 N.E.2d 212, 216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) 
(“[T]here is no distinction between ‘off duty’ or ‘on duty’ misconduct by a police officer. . . . By 
the very nature of his employment a police officer is in the eyes of the public and for the good of 
the department must exercise sound judgment and realize his responsibilities to the department 
and the public at all times.”); Eubank v. Sayad, 669 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (“In a 
very real sense a police officer is never truly off-duty.”). 
 209. The argument for maximizing governmental control over law enforcement—as 
opposed to most other government jobs—is bolstered by its paramilitary organization and its 
resulting reliance on structure, hierarchy, and order. See, e.g., Robin D. Barnes, Blue by Day 
and White by [K]night: Regulating the Political Affiliations of Law Enforcement and Military 
Personnel, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1158, 1166 (1996). 
 210. Courts generally characterize police officers as holding positions that “invite public 
scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion 
occasioned by the particular charges in controversy,” Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 n.13 
(1966), and thus are considered public officials for purposes of triggering the actual malice 
standard in defamation cases. See, e.g., Rattray v. City of Nat’l City, 36 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 
1994); Gray v. Udevitz, 656 F.2d 588, 591 (10th Cir. 1981); Rotkiewicz v. Sadowsky, 730 N.E.2d 
282, 287 (Mass. 2000); Tomkiewicz v. Detroit News, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 36, 42–43 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2001); Hirman v. Rogers, 257 N.W.2d 563, 566 (Minn. 1977); DeAngelis v. Hill, 847 A.2d 1261, 
1263–64 (N.J. 2004); Hailey v. KTBS, Inc., 935 S.W.2d 857, 860–61 (Tex. App. 1996). 
 211. See, e.g., Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 198 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that a 
teacher’s position “by its very nature requires a degree of public trust not found in many other 
positions of public employment”). 
 212. Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1377, 
1381 (1996). 
 213. See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do when You Are Not at Work?: Limiting 
the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 625, 681 n.378 (2004) (listing examples of teachers’ codes of conduct governing off-duty 
behavior). 
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In other words, some public employees may be so closely 
identified with their government employer that their own views 
cannot be dissociated from those of the government. To be sure, this 
is—or should be—a relatively small number of government jobs 
(although there may be room for disagreement over precisely how 
small this universe should be).214 Not all government workers are the 
same for these purposes, as some pose greater expressive threats than 
others because of the nature of their occupation.215 A categorical 
approach should thus defer only to government’s assertion of control 
over the off-duty speech of those employees considered 
quintessentially public servants. This framework would permit 
government to exert a great deal of control over the off-duty speech 
of employees in a few occupations, and very little control over the off-
duty speech of all others. 
The advantages and disadvantages of this approach include those 
of any bright-line rule. On the one hand, it is relatively predictable 
and easy to apply once a person identifies the category of 
quintessentially public servants, and thus communicates clear 
expectations to employers and employees alike. For example, law 
enforcement agencies could simply control the off-duty speech of 
police officers across the board; police officers would then know to 
adjust their expression accordingly. The off-duty speech of employees 
who do not fall into the category of inescapably public servants, in 
contrast, would remain protected. This type of approach has some 
precedent, moreover, as courts in other legal contexts have 
characterized certain workers as unable to escape their role as 
employees, permitting greater employer control over their speech. 
For example, private employers sometimes respond to an employee’s 
claims of impermissible retaliation against statutorily protected 
speech with arguments that they “owned” a certain employee’s 
                                                     
 214. For example, although I expect that most courts and observers would characterize law 
enforcement officers as falling into this category, there may be less consensus as to whether 
elementary and secondary school teachers act as the face and voice of the government to the 
same degree. 
 215. Building inspectors, for example, likely more easily escape their government role in the 
public eyes when off duty. See, e.g., Murray v. Jamison, 333 F. Supp. 1379, 1380–82 (W.D.N.C. 
1971) (finding that firing a city building inspection dispatcher for his Klan membership violated 
the First Amendment). Of course, a building inspector who engages in race discrimination in the 
performance of his job can be fired without running afoul of the First Amendment. 
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speech because of her particular role, and thus the speech was not the 
employee’s to be protected by statute.216 
On the other hand, the predictability and comparative 
administrative ease offered by a bright-line approach must be 
weighed against its rigidity and attendant limits, which include the 
difficulty in identifying the right categories of employees to be treated 
as unable to escape their roles as government employees for First 
Amendment purposes. A categorical rule gives employers a great 
deal of control over the employees who fall within that category—
control that may be unwise and unfair as both a constitutional and a 
practical matter. Indeed, this rule leads to the disquieting result that 
often underpaid police officers (and perhaps teachers) would face 
greater speech restrictions than other public employees. Should 
government be permitted to control all of police officers’ or teachers’ 
off-duty speech—whether racist, racially controversial, sexually 
explicit (or, in the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, “sleazy”),217 coarse, 
politically volatile, or otherwise?218 Consider a police officer who uses 
                                                     
 216. See, e.g., Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 627–28 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that a manager’s speech related to legal implications of scheduling changes was not 
protected under the Fair Labor Standards Act unless he steps “outside of his . . . role of 
representing the company” to assert interests adverse to his employer); Douglas v. 
DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 144 F.3d 364, 376 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding in-house 
counsel’s speech reporting discrimination by a client/employer was unprotected by Title VII 
because it divulged client confidences; speech “that breaches the ethical duties of the legal 
profession is unprotected under Title VII”); McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486–87 
(10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a personnel director’s speech informing her employer of possible 
FLSA violations was not protected against retaliation because she was not asserting FLSA 
rights or taking a position adverse to her employer’s interests but “merely performing her 
everyday duties as personnel director”); Rachel S. Arnow Richman, A Cause Worth Quitting 
For? The Conflict Between Professional Ethics and Individual Rights in Discriminatory 
Treatment of Corporate Counsel, 75 IND. L.J. 963, 983–85 (2000) (describing courts’ difficulties 
in assessing whether in-house counsel can escape their role as attorneys—including their duty of 
undivided loyalty to their clients—to speak for themselves as workers to assert discrimination 
complaints against employers or clients). 
  Similarly, the handful of state statutes that provide protections for public and private 
employees’ speech away from work generally include provisions that permit employers to 
control the off-duty speech of employees in certain jobs that require them to represent the 
employer at all times. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1)(a) (2008) (permitting 
employer discipline of off-duty speech that is “reasonably and rationally related to the 
employment activities and responsibilities of a particular employee or a particular group of 
employees, rather than to all employees of the employer”). 
 217. Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The law and their own 
safety demands that [police officers] be given a degree of respect, and the sleazy activities of 
Ronald and Megan Dible could not help but undermine that respect.”). 
 218. Along the same lines, Scott Moss has observed that courts have too quickly deferred to 
certain government institutions as unique, thus underprotecting First Amendment rights. Scott 
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foul or profane language while off-duty or a teacher who while off-
duty lobbies against or publicly criticizes education policy that he 
sincerely believes to be detrimental to students, such as a local 
district’s commitment to an abstinence-only program or the federal 
government’s No Child Left Behind Act. Such off-duty speech may 
further substantial First Amendment values not only in permitting the 
expression of individual autonomy, but also in contributing to the 
marketplace of ideas and facilitating citizens’ participation in 
democratic self-governance. 
Moreover, employees’ off-duty speech can, and does, occur in a 
wide range of situations that vary in their capacity to threaten 
government’s expressive interests. For example, the threat to 
government expression posed by an employee’s off-duty racist speech 
may vary depending on the employee’s occupation as police officer, 
high school teacher, cabinet secretary, personnel manager, desktop 
support technician, or motor vehicles clerk. Threats posed to 
government expression may similarly vary with the content of the 
contested off-duty speech: consider, for example the differing threats 
to government expression posed by an employee’s off-duty use of 
racial epithets, appearance in a sexually explicit video, artistic 
expression that is racially explicit, participation in a gay pride parade, 
or politically controversial speech, like advocacy for or against 
abortion restrictions, same-sex marriage, or immigration reform. 
Along the same lines, the extent of any threat to government 
expression may depend on the comparatively private or public setting 
of the off-duty speech. Consider, for example, an employee’s use of a 
racial epithet in a conversation with a friend at home or in a bar, as 
opposed to its use in a letter to the editor, at a sporting event, in a 
neighborhood argument, or on a blog, Facebook entry, or YouTube 
post. Government’s variable expressive interests thus invite 
examination of a more flexible standard that relies on case-by-case 
consideration of context to identify those situations in which 
government’s expressive fears are especially legitimate. 
2. A Contextual Approach.  Rather than assuming that the off-
duty speech of government employees in certain jobs—but only in 
those jobs—necessarily poses a substantial threat to government’s 
                                                                                                                          
A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My! A Cautionary Note About Excessive 
Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1671 (2007) 
(urging that “less institution-specific speech doctrine could take appropriate account of 
institutional difference without exaggerating those differences”). 
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own expression, a more flexible standard would instead require the 
government to prove such a threat on a case-by-case basis. Under this 
approach, an employee’s off-duty speech that does not explicitly 
associate itself with the government employer should generally be 
protected except in unusual circumstances. The remainder of this 
Subpart explores how government might show that a worker’s off-
duty speech actually undermined its own ability to communicate its 
views effectively. 
a. Public Employee Off-Duty Speech That Makes Explicit 
Reference to the Government Employer.  A government worker’s 
deliberate choice to refer to her employment in off-duty speech is 
especially likely to lead the public to make such an association as 
well. This was the case, for example, in City of San Diego v. Roe, in 
which an officer’s sexually explicit website included a video of himself 
stripping off a police uniform and masturbating, advertisements for 
the sale of police uniforms and other police equipment, and an e-mail 
address and user profile identifying him as employed in law 
enforcement.219 In cases like these, government’s fears that the public 
will associate the worker’s views with the government are especially 
reasonable because the employee has made that link explicit. 
Along these lines, observers are likely to attribute a law 
enforcement officer’s speech while in uniform, even if off duty, to the 
agency that employs her.220 Further emphasizing the power of the 
uniform and related indicia of law enforcement employment in 
linking the officer to the government that employs her, a number of 
courts have emphasized an officer’s acts while in uniform as leading a 
reasonable observer to conclude that the officer is acting under color 
of state law for Section 1983 purposes, regardless of whether the 
government actually authorized those actions.221 Indeed, the uniform 
                                                     
 219. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004) (per curiam). 
 220. See, e.g., Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 933–34 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that a police officer’s remarks while in uniform and claiming to speak for the department 
impaired the city’s interest in controlling who purports to speak on its behalf); Local 491, Int’l 
Bhd. of Police Officers. v. Gwinnett County, 510 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1278–87 (N.D. Ga. 2007) 
(upholding a city’s policy prohibiting officers from wearing uniforms at a county board of 
commissioners meeting); City of Indianapolis v. Heath, 686 N.E.2d 940, 946 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) 
(upholding the discipline of a police officer for making anti-Semitic remarks about the mayor 
while in uniform as likely to impair “confidence in and trust of that agency among members of 
the community”). 
 221. See, e.g., Roe v. Humke, 128 F.3d 1213, 1215–16 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that an officer 
was not acting under state law when committing a sexual assault because, inter alia, he was not 
in uniform, carrying his gun, or driving a police car); Pickrel v. City of Springfield, 45 F.3d 1115, 
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serves in many ways as a brand or trademark.222 As is the case with 
strong brands, the connection between a police uniform and the 
police department itself is so substantial that observers will likely 
attribute even the off-duty speech of an officer in uniform to the 
department itself, just as they are likely to attribute the views 
expressed in a letter on department letterhead to the department.223 
An employee’s off-duty but very public expression identifying his 
employment relationship may similarly pose a substantial threat to 
government’s own expression. Consider, for example, an officer’s off-
duty racist speech that directly references his law enforcement 
position in a way that casts doubt on the department’s commitment to 
equality224—as was the case with an officer who wrote magazine 
                                                                                                                          
1118–19 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding that an off-duty officer working as a private security guard 
acted under color of state law by, inter alia, wearing his uniform, displaying his badge, and 
carrying his gun); Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that an off-duty 
officer was acting under color of state law as a bank security guard when he flashed police 
identification while making a detention); Davis v. Murphy, 559 F.2d 1098, 1101 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(concluding that officers acted under color of state law in provoking a fight when, inter alia, they 
were carrying their guns and badges). 
 222. Trademarks are features that signal to the public the source of a service or product, and 
trademark infringement actions seek to prevent one party from capitalizing on the additional 
persuasive effects of having its product’s source misattributed to another, potentially more 
credible, party. See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 725 
(2004); Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020, 2021 
(2005). 
 223. For an application of this principle to public employees’ speech on government e-mail 
that may be the technological equivalent of letterhead, see Bowers v. Scurry, 276 Fed. App’x 
278, 280–83 (4th Cir. 2008). That case rejected a First Amendment challenge by a university 
human resources employee who had been disciplined for sending her colleagues an e-mail that 
was critical of pay restructuring legislation that the university had specifically supported. The 
court specifically noted the danger that readers would mistakenly attribute her views to the 
university because the messages were sent via university e-mail and bore her signature stamp 
indicating her university position. Id. 
 224. The Nebraska Supreme Court, for example, upheld the Nebraska State Patrol’s 
discharge of a trooper discovered to have joined the Klan—and, more specifically, to have 
participated in off-duty web discussions with others associated with the Klan in which he 
identified himself as employed in law enforcement in Nebraska. State v. Henderson, 762 N.W.2d 
1, 3–18 (Neb. 2009). The state court held “that Nebraska public policy precludes an individual 
from being reinstated to serve as a sworn officer in a law enforcement agency if that individual’s 
service would severely undermine reasonable public perception that the agency is uniformly 
committed to the equal enforcement of the law and that each citizen of Nebraska can depend on 
law enforcement officers to enforce the law without regard to race.” Id. at 17. The state supreme 
court addressed only whether the lower court had correctly vacated as contrary to public policy 
an arbitrator’s reinstatement award, declining to “revisit the arbitrator’s discussion of 
constitutional issues, although his conclusions on those issues [—that the State Patrol had 
violated the trooper’s constitutional rights—] are highly suspect.” Id. at 5. Central to the court’s 
holding was its conclusion that the trooper’s off-duty expression undermined the state patrol’s 
ability to control its own image: “One cannot simultaneously wear the badge of the Nebraska 
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articles that identified himself as a police officer and “characterized 
inner-city minority residents as ‘rats,’ women with cats as mentally 
unstable, homeless people as ‘criminals,’ and children with problems 
as ‘freaks.’”225 Government’s ability to establish an expressive threat 
will also often vary depending on the expression’s public or private 
setting: the more public the off-duty expression and its link to 
government employment—for example, expression that is broadcast 
over the Internet or in a letter to the editor as opposed to a private 
conversation with a friend—the stronger the possibility that the 
public will associate it with the governmental employer in a way that 
undermines the agency’s ability to communicate its own views 
effectively.226 
b. Public Perception of the Speaker’s Occupation or Position as 
Inescapably Governmental.  As discussed above,227 public employees 
in certain occupations may find it difficult to escape their 
governmental role even when off the job, such that onlookers readily 
associate speech with the government employer even if the 
employees themselves do not make the connection explicit. In 
contrast, observers may be less likely to attribute the speech of lower-
level employees (or employees whose positions do not require 
policymaking or extensive public interaction) to the agency that 
employs them. Whereas the categorical approach described in the 
preceding Subpart explored occupational exceptionalism as the sole 
determinant of government’s ability to control off-duty speech, a 
contextual approach might consider the nature of the speaker’s 
occupation one of many factors in assessing the threat to the 
government’s expressive interests. Government’s showing would be 
considerably stronger—although perhaps not dispositive—when the 
plaintiff is a law enforcement officer, or when the plaintiff is in a 
leadership position or a position that requires significant public trust 
                                                                                                                          
State Patrol and the robe of a Klansman without degrading what that badge represents when 
worn by any officer.” Id. at 18. 
 225. Nixon v. City of Houston, 511 F.3d 494, 500 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 
2504 (2008); see also Eaton v. Harsha, 505 F. Supp. 2d 948, 949–74 (D. Kan. 2007) (upholding 
police officers’ discharge for sending racially offensive e-mails to an African-American op-ed 
writer that identified their law enforcement employment). 
 226. See United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 443–52 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (concluding that a 
servicemember’s private conversations supportive of white supremacy were considerably less 
likely to threaten the armed forces’ expressive interests than his Facebook entry and other 
Internet communications on the same topic.). 
 227. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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and interaction such that the public may reasonably believe that she 
represents the government’s views.228 
Also relevant to this inquiry are the content of the contested 
speech and its conflict, if any, with the government’s transparently 
claimed views. Attention to these factors recognizes that certain 
combinations of the employee’s position and her expression’s content 
pose greater expressive threats to government than others. The off-
duty speech of a “quintessentially public servant” is most likely to 
pose a substantial threat to government’s own expressive interests 
when it clashes with a message that government has articulated and 
for which it can thus be held politically accountable.229 
Public safety agencies’ mission statements declaring their 
commitment to nondiscriminatory law enforcement provide 
particularly strong examples of transparent government messages,230 
as a police department seeking to communicate that “We enforce the 
law without regard to race” may be considerably less believable when 
it employs officers who are Klan members or who otherwise engage 
in racist off-duty speech.231 Police officers’ racist speech that 
                                                     
 228. See Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 2002) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(distinguishing anonymous off-duty racist speech by an officer assigned to internal computer 
operations from public communications of racism, especially by beat cops or policy leaders). 
 229. As Justice Stevens pointed out in another context, an organization’s concerns about 
expressive association are at their strongest when the organization advocates a specific 
viewpoint that it seeks to shield from distortion or interference by its association with a 
dissenting individual speaker. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 687 (2000) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he organization must at least show it has adopted and advocated an 
unequivocal position inconsistent with a position advocated or epitomized by the person whom 
the organization seeks to exclude.”). 
 230. Many police department mission statements express a commitment to evenhandedness 
(even as they vary in the breadth of their commitment). See, e.g., Porter County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 
Mission Statement, http://www.portercountysheriff.com/mission-statement.html (last visited 
June 21, 2009) (stating a commitment to treat “all citizens and fellow employees in a fair and 
equitable manner without regard to race, gender, religion, national origin, physical or mental 
disability or sexual orientation”); Ventnor City Police Dep’t, Mission Statement, 
http://www.ventnorcitypolice.org/mission_statement.htm (last visited June 21, 2009) (stating a 
commitment to “faithful service to the public without regard to race, religion, ethnicity, gender, 
social status or political affiliation”); The Village of Niles, IL, Niles Police Department Mission 
Statement, http://www.vniles.com/Content/templates/?a=69 (last visited June 21, 2009) (stating 
commitment to “equally and fairly protect and serve all those people within its jurisdiction 
without regard to race, color, religion, ethnicity, gender, age or sexual orientation”). 
 231. Consider, for example, a sheriff department’s employee who gives a television 
interview publicly identifying his off-duty work as a Klan organizer as well as his employment in 
law enforcement. See McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936, 937, 940 (11th Cir. 1985) (describing a 
strong public reaction reflecting “the notion that Jacksonville blacks should resist arrest by 
Sheriff’s personnel for fear of their lives” and holding “only that a law enforcement agency does 
not violate the First Amendment by discharging an employee whose active participation in an 
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undermines confidence in the agency’s declared commitment to 
evenhanded enforcement may be especially threatening in light of 
such agencies’ equal protection obligations along with historic and 
continuing concerns about the role of race in the administration of 
justice.232 
A court applying this principle might thus permit a police 
department to punish a police officer’s off-duty participation in a 
Klan parade but not in a Martin Luther King, Jr. Day celebration (or 
in a peace rally, gay pride parade, or antiabortion demonstration) 
because of the different types of threats this speech poses to the 
government’s communication of its own views. But although certain 
off-duty expression poses unique threats to law enforcement’s 
institutional mission, not all unpopular or controversial messages 
delivered by off-duty officers necessarily conflict with an agency’s 
own transparently articulated views—for example, sexually explicit 
but nonobscene speech, or certain controversial political views. 
Consider, for example, the facts in Flanagan v. Munger,233 in which the 
police department disciplined officers for stocking sexually explicit 
films in their off-duty video store business after receiving complaints 
from the public.234 The officers’ expression conflicted with no 
specifically articulated government viewpoint—it was simply alleged 
to be “conduct unbecoming an officer.”235 Without some showing of 
specific harm to its own communicative abilities, government’s 
concerns that the public will simply think less of an agency that 
employs an individual who engages in objectionable off-duty 
expression does not constitute the sort of substantial threat to 
government expression sufficient to justify control of employees’ off-
duty speech under a flexible contextual approach. 
Such viewpoint-based distinctions in assessing expression’s 
dangers—which are generally considered First Amendment 
                                                                                                                          
organization with a history of violent activity, which is antithetical to enforcement of the laws by 
state officers, has became known to the public and created an understandably adverse public 
reaction that seriously and dangerously threatens to cripple the ability of the law enforcement 
agency to perform effectively its public duties”). 
 232. See NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NAT’L 
ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 165–66 (1968); Barnes, supra note 209, at 1084–88 
(documenting the prevalence of law enforcement officers who are members of the Klan). 
 233. Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989). 
 234. Id. at 1567–68 (upholding an officer’s First Amendment challenge to his discipline for 
stocking sexually explicit films in his video store as protected off-duty speech unrelated to 
employment). 
 235. Id. at 1560. 
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anathema236—will cause many to hesitate. But the Court’s First 
Amendment doctrine already permits government employers to 
make viewpoint-specific distinctions when punishing on-duty speech 
that may disrupt workplace operations—such as speech critical of a 
government employer.237 Even outside the context of government 
employment, Steven Heyman, among others, notes the limitations of 
an insistence on content neutrality as “fatally one-sided, for it fails to 
recognize that some kinds of speech . . . inflict serious injury precisely 
because of their content.”238 He goes on to argue that hate speech is 
especially damaging in this regard.239 
In a related context, Caroline Mala Corbin has characterized 
government’s interest in dissociating itself from harmful messages—
like racist speech—as significantly stronger than its interest in 
distancing itself from merely “distasteful” expression, like certain 
sexually provocative speech or controversial political expression: 
“Government association with a pro-gun or pro-choice platform may 
be annoying for a reader with contrary views, but the government 
placing its imprimatur on a Nazi flag or a racial slur hurts.”240 For 
these reasons, off-duty viewpoints expressed by law enforcement 
officers that conflict with fundamental governmental commitments 
may be more damaging to the law enforcement mission than other 
views.241 Indeed, such speech can be perceived as especially harmful 
                                                     
 236. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (recounting the First 
Amendment’s bar on government’s viewpoint-based discrimination against private speech); 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992). 
 237. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (permitting discipline of an employee’s 
speech that was critical of her employer). 
 238. STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY 3 (2008); see also Charles R. 
Lawrence III, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 
431, 476–81 (arguing that certain racist speech is unusually harmful precisely because of its 
content); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1985) (arguing that a First Amendment insistence on content neutrality masks 
and reinforces substantive inequality among speakers). 
 239. HEYMAN, supra note 238, at 4. 
 240. See Corbin, supra note 103, at 685–89; see also Clare Huntington, Family Law’s 
Textures: Social Norms, Emotion, and the State, 59 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript 
at 40, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“[T]he important question [is] whether the state, 
through the apparatus of public law, should seek to reinforce norms that are not consistent (as 
they so often are not) with principles of tolerance and equality. . . . Where the state gives 
sanction to social norms that ostracize, stigmatize, or the like, that is more troubling than where 
the state reinforces norms of parental concern, stability, and empathy.”). 
 241. As Joseph Tussman observed in the context of government’s educational expression, 
“The danger in the careless use of notions of neutrality and non-partisanship is that the concern 
for fairness may be taken as requiring the relinquishing of commitment.” JOSEPH TUSSMAN, 
NORTON IN FINAL FINAL 9/3/2009  9:05:16 PM 
2009] CONSTRAINING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH 63 
when uttered by someone in a position of government power, even 
when off-duty. Drawing these distinctions, however, requires 
particular confidence in government’s—and courts’—ability to sort 
the damaging effects of speech by content, an inquiry that can be 
difficult and uncomfortable.242 
As is the case with the other considerations discussed in this 
Subpart, this factor may not be dispositive in and of itself. The 
absence of a transparent viewpoint that government seeks to protect 
may not always defeat the government’s ability to establish an 
expressive threat. Government’s decision to remain neutral or silent 
on a particular topic, for example, may reflect a strategic decision to 
conserve limited political capital or to reserve judgment on a 
controversy as the public debate continues; in any event, that decision 
also provides the public with valuable information about its 
government’s expressive choices.243 Normally, however, First 
Amendment transparency norms should require government to 
communicate clear expectations about the message that it seeks to 
protect—both to promote the government’s accountability to the 
public for its expressive choices and to prevent the chilling of speech 
by employees uncertain about what they may say without fear of 
discipline. For these reasons, government’s expressive concerns 
should be considered most weighty when it has provided clear notice 
of the expression that it seeks to safeguard. And in a multifactor 
contextual analysis of this sort, the degree of particularity required of 
such notice may well vary with the nature of the public employment. 
For example, as government alter egos, law enforcement officers, and 
other leaders might require less specific notice of their employers’ 
expressive expectations than lower-level or less high-profile jobs. 
Not surprisingly, the strengths and weaknesses of the contextual 
approach mirror those of most flexible standards. On one hand, the 
contextual approach permits courts to tailor their rulings to the often-
unique facts of a given case. By adjusting for key distinctions in the 
type of public employment and the nature and setting of the 
                                                                                                                          
GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 80 (1977) (discussing how public schools must be nonpartisan 
yet not “neutral” in terms of their commitment to certain political values). 
 242. As Professor Corbin acknowledges, the distinction between “harmful” and 
“distasteful” speech is “hotly contested.” Corbin, supra note 103, at 685–86. 
 243. Requiring organizations to speak clearly on certain topics may not be practical. See 
Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A Tripartite 
Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1542 (2001) (noting, in another context, that a similar 
requirement for private groups “misses the subtlety of speech, especially the way in which a 
group can ‘speak’ about a subject by insisting on silence about that subject”). 
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employee’s contested speech, this approach may enhance the 
possibility of a satisfying outcome.244 On the other hand, its inherent 
flexibility leads to concerns about unpredictability and inconsistency. 
C. Applications and Objections 
For an illustration of how the choice between a categorical and 
contextual approach may lead to different outcomes, consider the 
differing opinions in Pappas v. Giuliani.245 There the plaintiff police 
officer brought a First Amendment challenge to his discharge for 
mailing anonymous racist materials to various nonprofit organizations 
that had sent him fundraising solicitations.246 The majority essentially 
adopted what I have called a categorical approach, characterizing the 
speech of a police officer as inevitably associated with the views of his 
department, regardless of context: 
  For a New York City police officer to disseminate leaflets that 
trumpet bigoted messages expressing hostility to Jews, ridiculing 
African Americans and attributing to them a criminal disposition to 
rape, robbery, and murder, tends to promote the view among New 
York’s citizenry that those are the opinions of New York’s police 
officers. The capacity of such statements to damage the effectiveness 
of the police department in the community is immense.247 
In contrast, then-Judge Sotomayor’s dissent, using reasoning similar 
to my proposed contextual standard, focused on the specific factual 
context of the officer’s speech, noting that his job involved neither 
policymaking nor public contact (he was assigned to a computer 
station), that his speech made no reference to his employment in law 
enforcement, and indeed that it was intended to be private and 
anonymous.248 Under those circumstances, she would find no 
legitimate threat to the department’s public image or to its credibility 
in communicating a commitment to racial evenhandedness.249 
As another illustration of a tough case, consider the example of a 
prominent university human resources vice president who, on her 
own time and without identifying her job, wrote a newspaper column 
                                                     
 244. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1302 
(2008) (discussing the comparative costs and benefits of rules versus standards). 
 245. Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 246. Id. at 144–45. 
 247. Id. at 146–47. 
 248. Id. at 154–59 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 249. Id. 
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that questioned gay rights.250 Does the First Amendment permit the 
university to discipline her to protect the credibility of its announced 
opposition to discrimination in all forms?251 The factors shaping the 
extent of the threat posed by the employee’s speech cut both ways. 
The university had engaged in transparent government speech for 
which it could be held politically accountable: commitment to a policy 
that bars sexual orientation discrimination. The worker’s speech 
occurred off duty and did not reference her employer, although it 
occurred in a very public setting where many readers knew of her 
university position. Under either approach, the outcome may turn on 
just how prominent a role in the university she played: the higher her 
position, the more likely observers will associate her views with the 
university, and the more likely they will understand her to speak for 
the university even away from work. 
Both the categorical approach and the flexible contextual 
approach have their strengths and weaknesses. Both approaches also 
remain vulnerable to the charge that they overstate courts’ 
institutional competence to weigh the interests posed by these sorts of 
personnel disputes—and that instead courts should defer to 
government employers’ managerial judgments about their own 
operational needs. But, as explained earlier,252 unblinking judicial 
acquiescence to governmental employers frustrates what should be a 
foundational commitment to transparent government. Such deference 
undermines those values when it permits government employers to 
fire workers for their off-duty speech without identifying real threats 
to the government’s own expressive interests for which it can be held 
politically accountable. 
There may be no completely satisfying solution, but I find both 
the categorical approach and the flexible contextual approach to be 
preferable to the status quo, which is far too deferential to 
government’s claimed expressive interests. On balance, the 
contextual approach better comports with the notion that the threat 
posed to government’s expressive interests varies significantly with 
the context of an employee’s off-duty speech even within certain 
categories of employees closely identified with their governmental 
roles. 
                                                     
 250. See Jaschik, supra note 15. 
 251. Of course, the First Amendment poses no bar to disciplining her for her conduct, rather 
than her speech, if she is found to have engaged in discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation while on the job. 
 252. See supra notes 54–69 and accompanying text. 
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The flexibility of a multifactor contextual standard invites 
charges that it is too difficult to apply and will generate unacceptably 
unpredictable results. Inquiries into whether and when employers can 
be said to “own” (and thus control) the off-duty speech of employees 
based on public perception, however, are not uncommon in other 
legal contexts.253 Moreover, for an example of the Supreme Court’s 
ability to apply a similar contextual inquiry to employee speech while 
at work, consider Rankin v. McPherson,254 in which the Court found 
no substantial threat to the government’s expressive interests after 
considering the plaintiff’s position, the nature of her speech, and its 
setting.255 There, the plaintiff, a nineteen-year-old clerk in the sheriff’s 
department, was assigned to a work station that did not involve public 
contact in a job that required her to “type data from court papers into 
a computer.”256 She “was not a commissioned peace officer, did not 
wear a uniform, and was not authorized to make arrests or permitted 
to carry a gun.”257 She was fired for stating, after hearing of the 
assassination attempt on President Reagan, “[I]f they go for him 
again, I hope they get him.”258 The remark took place at work during a 
private conversation between the plaintiff and her boyfriend, who was 
also a co-worker.259 Although the sheriff’s department has a legitimate 
expressive interest in protecting the public’s understanding of its 
transparent commitment to vigorous law enforcement,260 under these 
circumstances, the plaintiff’s speech posed little threat to that 
expression: the speech was uttered by a nonuniformed employee in a 
private conversation heard by no member of the public. As 
concurring Justice Powell observed, “The risk that a single, offhand 
                                                     
 253. For example, private employers as principals are held to “own”—and thus be held 
legally responsible for—the defamatory or otherwise intentionally tortious speech of their 
employees and agents. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 (2006). This requires courts 
to determine whether “a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf 
of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.” Id. § 2.03. 
 254. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
 255. Id. at 379–94. 
 256. Id. at 380–81. 
 257. Id. at 380. 
 258. Id. at 381. Even though it occurred at work, the plaintiff’s speech did not satisfy the test 
for government speech proposed in Part II because she was not hired to deliver a specific 
viewpoint on the part of the government; indeed, her speech would not even fall within 
Garcetti’s much more government-friendly “pursuant to official duties” test. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See id. at 401 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the sheriff’s interest in maintaining a 
“public image consistent with his office’s law enforcement duties”). 
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comment directed to only one other worker will . . . undermine the 
mission of the office borders on the fanciful.”261 
In dissent, Justice Scalia bemoaned the effect of the majority’s 
holding on what I have characterized as government’s expressive 
interests: 
  I, for one, do not look forward to the new First Amendment 
world the Court creates, in which nonpolicymaking employees of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission must be permitted to 
make remarks on the job approving of racial discrimination, 
nonpolicymaking employees of the Selective Service System to 
advocate noncompliance with the draft laws, and . . . 
nonpolicymaking constable’s deputies to express approval for the 
assassination of the President.262 
Although Justice Scalia correctly identifies government’s expressive 
interests, the examples he cites may or may not threaten those 
interests depending on the context. On one hand, they clash with 
transparently claimed government viewpoints. On the other hand, 
they pose considerably less risk to government’s expressive interests 
if uttered off-duty by a low-level employee, especially when the 
employee is out of uniform or engaged in a private conversation 
rather than speaking in a public setting. 
To be sure, a contextual approach still makes for hard cases. But 
one of my hopes is that courts will understand these as hard cases, 
rather than creating too-simplistic rules that obviate the need to 
engage in the challenging task of contextual inquiry. 
CONCLUSION 
Government workers speak in a wide variety of settings. 
Sometimes they speak for the government, sometimes they speak for 
themselves, and sometimes they speak for themselves in ways that 
reflect on their government employer. Justice Stevens recognized this 
complexity when he observed that the correct answer to the question 
whether the First Amendment protects public employee speech “is 
‘Sometimes,’ not ‘Never.’”263 
In recent years, however, courts have increasingly answered 
“Hardly ever” to the question of whether the First Amendment 
                                                     
 261. Id. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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protects public employees’ speech. Courts’ expansive, but largely 
unexamined, deference to government’s own expressive claims offers 
a helpful prism through which to understand this trend. For example, 
after Garcetti too quickly characterized employees’ on-duty speech as 
the government’s own and thus entirely within the government’s 
power to control, lower courts now routinely apply Garcetti’s bright-
line rule to reject the First Amendment claims of public employees 
punished after their on-the-job reports of safety hazards, financial 
improprieties, and a wide range of other legal and ethical misconduct. 
In other cases, courts too readily permit government to punish public 
employees for their speech away from work, deferring to government 
claims that even off-duty expression sufficiently reflects on the 
government to justify the government’s control of that speech as well. 
Taken together, these trends now lead to the rejection of public 
employees’ free speech claims in a growing range of cases, 
threatening key First Amendment values. More careful attention to 
what it is that government seeks to express—and whether that 
expression is actually threatened by contested employee speech—can 
help capture and accommodate those interests more precisely while 
providing greater protection for workers’ own free speech rights as 
well as the public’s interest in transparent government. 
